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Abstract  
 
The study of international environmental regime effectiveness is contextualized in 
globalization. In this classificatory and comparative study, the cases of the ozone depletion 
regime and climate change regime are evaluated for their level of effectiveness. Regime 
effectiveness is conceptualized in a three-fold indicator operationalization of “output,” 
“outcome,” and “impact.” This multiple-measurement approach to regime effectiveness 
facilitates a robustness check of the levels of effectiveness of the ozone depletion regime and 
the climate change regime. The study employs an analytical framework based on the 
standards of collective optimum and goal attainment. The classification of regime 
effectiveness through this framework provides nuanced findings for each regime depending 
on which operationalization of effectiveness is applied. The comparison between the regimes 
finds that they are similar in terms of the outcome indicator, but vary significantly on the 
output and impact indicators, with the ozone regime scoring a high level of effectiveness and 
the climate regime ranking a low level of effectiveness. The findings emphasize areas of 
institutional design and scientific overlap between the regimes that could be used as a 
platform for a future explanatory study.  
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1.    Introduction  
1.1.    Global Environmental Politics – A Crux of Globalization  
 
Climate change and depletion of the ozone layer present humanity with evidence of 
globalization in both the nature of the problems and the political solutions needed to solve 
them. Climate change and ozone layer depletion are trans-boundary in that what is deposited 
into the atmosphere, regardless of its source, immediately becomes a part of the global 
commons. Thus, the scientific underpinnings of these two global problems highlight that 
ecological systems are inherently interconnected. Since the 1970s, humankind has begun to 
fully comprehend the level of global interconnection present on the planet, exemplified by the 
current era termed globalization. During this time, economic, social, and political aspects of 
human life have expanded and extended in an increasingly trans-boundary manner. This 
explosive growth in globalization has instigated activities that adversely affect the 
environment, particularly problems like climate change and ozone depletion. However, as the 
natural environment has changed, states and other actors have developed multilateral political 
mechanisms to address these global issues, such as international environmental regimes. 
Environmental problems such as climate change and the depletion of the ozone layer are 
collective problems that require cooperation on an unprecedented international scale. 
International environmental regimes coordinate solutions to these problems. In this thesis, the 
point of entry to the study of globalization is in the field of international environmental 
regimes, where economic, political, and environmental aspects of globalization intersect.  
The study of international environmental regimes, the overarching field within which 
this thesis is placed, is contextualized in globalization. The problems these regimes strive to 
resolve are inextricably tied to increasingly long-range human economic activity of 
globalization and because the regime themselves operate on a global scale. The study of 
international regime effectiveness explores the quality and conditions of the institutions 
instrumental in managing collective action problems at the global level. Political science and 
economics offer the theoretical foundations for this field, because although globalization has 
called into question the relevance of boundaries and states, international regimes remain 
based on state centric politics. 
Exploring international environmental regime effectiveness is central to scholars 
studying global environmental politics. The rise of environmental issues to the forefront of 
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policy agenda setting in the 1970s gathered steam as international environmental agreements 
continued to grow throughout the 1980s (Zürn, 1998); there are currently more than two 
hundred major regimes in the field of international environmental protection alone (Gehring 
& Oberthür, 2004) . Global climate change and ozone layer depletion have remained 
politically pertinent as foci for the study of international politics since their introduction into 
the field since the mid-1980s (Zürn, 1998). The study of regime effectiveness has contributed 
to the field of international environmental politics by validating that institutions have the 
potential to be effective in the management of environmental problems. Numerous studies 
and research projects of the past decade have shown that international environmental regimes 
have the capacity to achieve positive improvements (Haas, Keohane, & Levy, 1993); (Miles 
et al., 2002); (Breitmeier, Young, & Zurn, 2006); the question is only a matter of to what 
extent the regime is effective, and what factors and mechanisms condition the extent of 
regime effectiveness. In the following section, this will be expanded upon.   
1.2.    Research Question and Justification of Research Interest    
This thesis evaluates and compares the effectiveness of the ozone depletion and 
climate change international regimes. This study’s research objective encompasses evaluation 
of politically and scientifically highly complex phenomena, yet despite complexity the 
research question is essentially straightforward:  
How effective are the international ozone depletion and climate change regimes and 
how do these levels of effectiveness compare to each other?  
This study aims to decisively and systematically answer this question. Through the 
evaluative process, the thesis utilizes a distinct analytical framework and determinate 
measurement of effectiveness from the perspective of political science. The thesis addresses 
whether these two regimes can be considered effective in managing the challenges and 
problems motivating their formation. The results serve as a fundamental platform for research 
aiming to explain regime effectiveness.  
The classification of effectiveness is completed through applying a three-fold 
operationalization of regime effectiveness allowing for a systematic comparison between the 
two regimes. Regime effectiveness is conceptualized as institutional attributes of the regime 
(“output”), changes in states’ emissions patterns (“outcome”), as well as environmental 
consequences of coordinated action (“impact”), as is described in detail in chapter two. A 
multiple-measurement approach to regime effectiveness facilitates a robustness check of the 
conventional wisdom that the ozone layer regime is more effective than the climate change 
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regime. The study aims to provide nuanced findings depending on which operationalization of 
effectiveness is applied.  This thesis’ use of an applied analytical framework sets the present 
study apart from studies that evaluate regime effectiveness with less decisive and transparent 
methods of analysis. 
The climate and ozone regimes share much in common, but also diverge in their 
differing success stories: the ozone regime is the near poster-child of international 
environmental regimes and is considered successful in several regards, which contrasts starkly 
with the troubled teenager of the climate change regime for which success at a substantial 
level is much more uncertain. From the perspective of environmental politics, these regimes 
are unique in that addressing atmospheric conflicts pose particular warrant for a response of 
collective action. The root of both problems – emissions of ozone depleting substances and 
greenhouse gasses – are global in scale, as are their adverse impacts. In grappling with such 
all-encompassing problems these regimes exist in a class of their own, possibly only rivaled 
by the continuing destruction of biological diversity at a global scale. 
Research within the field of international environmental regime effectiveness is 
conducted with the ultimate aim of finding optimal solutions to environmental problems like 
these. The importance of evaluating regime effects lies in its relevance for understanding the 
strengths and weaknesses of regime’s design and in the value of international environmental 
cooperation in general. Before being able to recommend suggestions for change, it is vital to 
have a concrete understanding of how regime effectiveness should be measured and 
evaluated. Such an understanding eventually leads to the ability to answer questions such as 
these: What type of regime is the most effective? How can differences in regime effectiveness 
be explained? Although this study – mainly because of limitations in time and space – is not 
designed to answer these highly relevant yet complex questions, it aims to provide the 
nuanced understanding of regime effectiveness necessary for further contemplation. After 
assessing the levels of regime effectiveness for the two cases, the study finds that in a 
comparison of the largely highly effective ozone regime and the largely low-effective climate 
regime, there are several areas that serve as foundation for future research. 
1.3.    Methodological Remarks and Research Design 
In this section, the design and methodology of the study will be presented, by first 
discussing the methodological choices and analytical framework. The majority of the 
analytical framework – the essence of my methodology – lies in chapter two with the 
theoretical foundation upon which it lies. Regime effectiveness is challenging to 
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operationalize and it is therefore of essence to carefully define the terms, indicators, and 
analytical framework of the project. In the following section the design and methods of study 
will be clarified for this purpose.  
The study employs a descriptive and classificatory methodology at the international 
level of analysis. As will be clarified further in chapter two, this means that regime 
effectiveness is examined and operationalized on the an global, aggregate measurement in the 
form of the texts of protocols, conventions, or other legal product of the regime at the 
international level; aggregate emissions behavior; aggregate environmental quality impact 
(See 2.3 for details). A case study comparative approach is utilized that is in following with 
the bulk of research on regime effectiveness, which also employs qualitative methods, 
particularly the case study method (Breitmeier, et al., 2006, p. 9). This is largely because 
when striving to compare international environmental regimes, the number of cases from 
which to choose from is limited. Thus, the case method is ideal for a low-N study such as this. 
 In addition, another important consideration for evaluating regime effectiveness is the 
concept of time. A measurement of effectiveness can only refer to one particular point in time 
(Arild  Underdal, 2002a). This is for several reasons, one being that both political (in the 
regime negotiations) and scientific (environmental degradation or improvement) changes are 
constantly occurring. As Underdal (2002b, p. 13) points out, it would be expected that the 
effectiveness of a regime increase with time in a curvilinear fashion, with eventual 
diminishment to obsolescence. Thus, it is important that when comparing two regime 
indicators, they are measured at the same stages in their life cycles. In the case that the stages 
cannot be synchronized, it is important to exert caution when comparing across regimes 
(Arild  Underdal, 2002a). This was taken into consideration in the design in this study and 
controlled for, where possible.  
This study’s methods are articulated in the use of an analytical framework grounded in 
theory and research on regime effectiveness. The details for this framework are presented in 
chapter two, but will be briefly described here. The core of the framework is based on the use 
of three indicators that provide three complementary operationalizations of regime 
effectiveness, as is proposed by Underdal (2002a) and Mitchell (2008). Empirical findings are 
collected and mapped according to these indicators. In the analysis, each indicator is 
juxtaposed against a defined standard in order to classify that indicator’s level of 
effectiveness. This allows for comparison of the results for each regime, allowing for the 
question of whether the variation in regime effectiveness across cases differs depending on 
what operationalization of regime effectiveness applied to be answered in the process. Of 
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importance to the methods of this thesis is maintaining transparency in the application of the 
analytical framework to the empirical findings. In this study, this involves the critical 
assessment of regime effectiveness where standards are necessary. Here, it is important to 
clarify what the standards for the level of effectiveness, as it is important that the reader 
clearly understands how the author arrives at the given effectiveness conclusions (Arild 
Underdal & Young, 2004, p. 34). In particular, it is important to employ consistent 
terminology that can be compared across cases (Breitmeier, et al., 2006, p. 10). The reliability 
of the study lies in the transparency of the methods used and the highly detailed 
operationalization of the indicators. The standards and indicators will be operationalized and 
justified in chapter two.  
To the extent of being transparent, assigning a score of effectiveness is a demanding 
aspect of the analysis. This study uses prose to describe the effectiveness classification score 
in attempt to avoid the rigidity of numerical scores, as previous research shows that the 
increased transparency gained from numerical assignment of effectiveness may lead to 
expressions of exactness with scant justification (Steinar Andresen & Wettestad, 2004, p. 63), 
reflecting the extremely political and complex nature of regime effectiveness. In the Miles et 
al. project (2002), such numerical scorings were attached, but not without criticism (Underdal 
2002b).  A multiple-measurement approach to regime effectiveness allows for a robustness 
check of the effectiveness scores that are assigned to each regime.   
The data utilized for this study as organized in chapter three was collected using a 
variety of primary and secondary sources. For the historical accounts of regime formation and 
negotiation processes, I refer to official publications by the two secretariats, but also on 
secondary historical documentary accounts of the process. Data regarding the output of the 
regime, such as the conventions, protocols, control measures, annexes, etc. was collected 
through a review of original texts and officially published information. Data regarding the 
scientific advice for the solution of the problem, emissions trends, and the current status of the 
problem was attained through reading publications by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and the Ozone Trends Panel (OTM), as well as other peer-reviewed 
scientific research.   
This introductory chapter has set the scene for the remainder of the thesis by first 
framing the relevance of the topic in the field of globalization and political science; presenting 
the research objective and question; and providing important information regarding the 
methodological choices of the study. The thesis is structured in the following manner. In 
chapter two the theoretical debates on international regimes will be presented in an effort to 
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explain the informed conceptual framework chosen for analysis. In chapter three, the data 
necessary for the effectiveness classification is empirically mapped and presented. In chapter 
four, the analysis is the focus where regime effectiveness is classified. Additionally, the two 
regimes are compared. Finally, in chapter five, a discussion of results is briefly presented with 
closing remarks.  In the next chapter, the methods of data analysis – the analytical framework  
– will be presented in depth after a review of the theoretical foundation of the field of 
international environmental regime effectiveness.  
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2.    Theoretical Debates on International Regimes: 
Towards an Informed Conceptual Framework for 
Analysis   
In the present chapter, I review relevant literature on international regimes in an effort to 
understand and draw upon the analytical debates related to (i) the conceptual understanding of 
the phenomena of international regimes and regime effectiveness, and (ii) the arguments 
underpinning the two well-established explanatory frameworks which shed light first on the 
conditions for regime-formation and change, and second on the conditions for regime 
effectiveness. This broader approach to the theoretical international regimes debate is chosen 
in an effort to clarify how the concept of regime effectiveness will be conceptually delimited, 
empirically measured, and fit into the broader picture of theoretical debates. As indicated in 
Figure 1, the main emphasis of the present chapter is to prepare the subsequent mapping, 
classification and comparison of the international climate change and ozone-depletion 
regimes in terms of regime effectiveness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main analytical decision resulting from this review lies in the concept of regime 
effectiveness which will be defined, and subsequently operationalized along three dimensions 
related to the institutional attributes of the regime (“output”), changes in states’ emissions 
patterns (“outcome”), as well as to environmental consequences of coordinated action 
Conceptual debate empirically applied: 
Mapping, classifying and comparing the 
international climate change and ozone depletion 
regimes in terms of regime effectiveness 
“First debate”: 
The definition of 
the concept of 
international 
regimes 
“Second debate”: 
Arguing model 
explaining the 
formation and 
change of inter‐
national regimes 
“Third debate”: 
The definition and 
operationalization 
of the concept of 
regime effective‐
ness 
“Fourth debate”: 
Arguing model 
explaining vari‐
ation in 
international 
regime effective‐
ness 
Figure 1: The Broader Theoretical Context and the Particular Application of the Regime 
Effectiveness Concept 
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(“impact”). Prior to this, the scholarly debates on the definition of international regimes and 
the explanation of regime-formation and change will be briefly reviewed. By presenting the 
relevant scholarly debates surrounding international regimes and regime effectiveness, the 
present chapter grounds the subsequent analytical consideration of how regime effectiveness 
is operationalized and eventually assessed in chapters three and four.  
2.1.    “First debate”: Defining the concept of “International 
Regimes” 
 
International regimes, as the main concept and phenomenon of this study, must first be 
adequately defined and conceptualized. In the following section, the concept of the 
international regime will be reviewed starting from its beginnings in the field of political 
science. The origins of international regimes research can be considered a repercussion of 
globalization and interdependence on international relations and international political 
economy. It was in the 1970s that growing “complex interdependence” (Robert O.  Keohane 
& Nye, 1977) characterized by transnational trade and finance relations, coalitions, and cross-
border contacts, challenged the state-centric paradigm (Cohen, 2008). To grapple with 
increases in globalization and impediment on sovereignty, the study of international 
institutions or an alternate system of governance gained prominence. 
The concept of the international regime was conceived in the late 1970s to early ’80s, 
through initiatives by scholars Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner1. Conceptually the 
field of regimes offered scholars the ability to move beyond the study of formal organizations 
to understanding how international cooperation becomes coordinated and institutionalized 
(Cohen 2008). Despite the “wooly” nature of the concept of the international regime (Strange, 
1982, p. 479); Cohen 2008), Krasner provides the academically accepted definition: 
Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms 
of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making 
procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice (Krasner, 1982, p. 2) 
 
Krasner’s consensus definition is the definition most largely used, mainly due to agreement 
about two particularly poignant aspects of an international regime. Krasner used the term 
social institution and issue specific (Levy, Young, & Zürn, 1994), terms that subsequently 
have been adopted into other definitions of the international regime (Seter, 2011). For 
                                                
1 Largely via the journal International Organization (1982). 
2 The counterfactual presented by both Sprinz and Helm (2000; 1999) and Hovi et al. (2003) has foundations in 
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example, Young holds that regimes are social institutions governing the actions of those 
interested in or meaningful sets of activities (Young, 1980). Bringing in further nuances, 
Breitmeier states that “international regimes are social institutions created to respond to the 
demand for governance relating to specific issues” (Breitmeier, 2006).  
Critique of the definition exists. These criticisms center on two particular points of 
Krasner’s statement. The first criticism regards the exact meaning and relationship between 
the “principles,” “norms,” “rules,” and “procedures.” The terms representing four integral 
components of the regime are unfortunately quite difficult to distinguish from one another. A 
further criticism focuses on the formulation “around which actors’ expectations converge” as 
what area of the issue the regime is formed around remains ambiguous (Hasenclaver, Mayer, 
& Rittberger, 1996). Despite these concerns about the absolute definition of an international 
regime, there remains a general agreement upon two important aspects of the concept, one 
being that international regimes are social institutions and secondly that they are issue-
specific. Given this definition, international regimes are assumed to influence the behavior of 
states by facilitating cooperation on problems, challenges or opportunities which are too 
costly, complex, or wide in scope for any single country to solve, manage, or reap the benefits 
from on its own. 
2.2.    “Second debate”: Explaining the Formation of and Change 
in International Regimes 
 
Having clarified the concept of international regimes and thereby establishing regimes 
as a potential dependent variable for study, the debate on international regimes progressed to 
addressing why and how international regimes are established in the first place. What are the 
conditions for regime-formation and change? These questions are best addressed through 
three academic schools of thought that approach the explanations to these questions from 
different angles and focus on different explanatory factors (Hasenclaver, et al., 1996), as is 
briefly described in Figure 2. The three schools - neorealist (the power based argument), the 
liberal institutionalist (the interest based argument) and the cognitivist (the knowledge based 
argument) - will be briefly described below. 
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 The neorealist approach explains regime formation and change from the view that 
state’s self-interested and utility maximizing properties are an explanation for cooperation in 
the international regime (Hasenclaver, Mayer, & Rittberger, 2000a). The neorealist focuses on 
the role of a power structure that favors the formation of regimes. In this literature, discussion 
is centered on the existence of a hegemon. Kenneth Waltz (1979) formulated the two 
assumptions which characterize the neorealist school of thought: i) states are the main actors 
in international politics and that without a super national system of authority, conflict will 
occur, and  ii) as the international system is characterized by anarchy, it is also characterized 
by self-help, and therefore has a collective action dilemma (Waltz, 1959).  In such a system, 
neorealists use hegemonic stability theory (Kindelberger, 1973) to explain international 
regime formation and change through the behavior of a hegemon that establishes norms for 
conduct on several issue areas.  
The liberal institutionalist approach takes configuration of state-interests as point of 
departure in explaining regime formation and change. This school is considered the most 
influential school in the field of environmental regimes (Vogler, 2003). Liberal 
institutionalists emphasize interest-based theories that focus on how international regimes 
help states realize common interests by reducing both uncertainty and transaction costs due to 
transparency and multilateral structure established by means of the regime (Hasenclaver, et 
al., 1996). To understand this school of thought’s theoretical underpinnings, Mancur Olson’s 
(1965) research on public goods provides a platform for exploration. Olson observed that 
despite the fact that groups of rational actors may have a common interest or objective, they 
may not act in order to achieve the objective (Olson, 1965). Olson concluded that these 
commonalities could be considered public goods, which can also be defined as “having 
benefits that cannot easily be confined to a single “buyer” (or set of buyers). Yet once they are 
provided, many can enjoy them for free (Kaul, Grunberg, & Stern, 1999). To illustrate the 
salience of the public goods in regime formation, liberal institutionalists utilize the concept of 
market failure, which refers to situations in which the outcomes of market-mediated 
Figure 2: Model for the Explanation of Regime Formation and Change 
   
Formation and 
change of 
international 
regimes 
 
Distribution of Power   
Configuration of 
Interests 
Knowledge Perception  
Realist reasoning 
Liberal institutionalist reasoning 
Cognitivist reasoning 
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interaction are sub-optimal (Keohane, 1982). The market’s imperfection, as evidenced by 
market-failure, is similar to the imperfection of the international system, which has barriers 
for effective cooperation on global problems. In such a system, lacking institutions negative 
externalities are common (Seter, 2011). In order to reduce negative externalities and achieve a 
more optimal outcome states may decide to coordinate their behavior in a given area through 
collaboration in a regime (Krasner, 1982).  
In the cognitivist approach regime-formation and change are explained in terms of 
social and consensual knowledge. Cognivists are skeptical towards rationalist theories of 
international politics particularly because interests are considered exogenously given. 
Cognitivists consider the interests of the state as an empirical question and as constantly 
evolving as states learn and change ideologically (Seter, 2011). States’ interests may change 
over time also due to learning interactions between actors, for example during meetings of the 
international regime (Steinar  Andresen, Skodvin, Underdal, & Wettestad, 2000). Although 
significant differences exist within the cognitivist school, the field is generally considered 
especially relevant in the field of international environmental regimes. Of particular note is 
research focused on epistemic communities, whereby communities of scientists and have been 
shown to play an important role in forming the interests of countries (Neumayer, 2001, p. 
133). Cognitivists highlight that high levels of uncertainty characterize environmental 
problems, making correct scientific information vital in the decision making by states 
(Mitchell, 2010). The idea that interests can be adapted based on the variables of knowledge 
and ideas allows the cognitive approach space for explaining regime formation and change.  
The approaches presented in this section highlight differences in explanation of 
formation and change in a regime. Whether power-distribution, configuration of interests, and 
epistemic communities/knowledge are seen as competing or complementary explanations of 
regime-formation varies through the literature. The accuracy of these arguments and the 
related schools of thought as presented above will not be further discussed in this study but 
provides a contextual background for better understanding the subsequent “third debate” on 
which my empirical study rests. 
2.3.    “Third debate”: On the definition and operationalization 
of Regime Effectiveness 
Having briefly reviewed the scholarly debate on the delimitation of the “international 
regime” and the model explaining regime-formation, this section defines and operationalizes 
regime effectiveness which is the key concept through which the international climate change 
and ozone-depletion regimes are to be described, classified and compared in this study. This 
  12 
is also a necessary precursor for students striving to explain regime effectiveness for which 
there are multiple avenues of research. The added analytical demands on an explanatory 
approach to regime effectiveness will be discussed in section 2.4, but will not be elaborated 
on empirically in the present thesis. 
Regime effectiveness refers to the extent to which the international regime manages or 
solves the trans-boundary problem that originally inspired the establishment of the problem-
solving regime. At its core, evaluation of regime effectiveness measures how the regime 
functions as a political tool in reaching its stated goals (Mohr, 1995; Seter, 2011). Doing this 
requires a clear understanding of what the regime’s objectives are and what the success 
criterion of effectiveness is in the assessed case. In the present study, a multiple 
operationalization of regime effectiveness is applied in terms of “output,” “outcome,” and 
“impact” (Easton, 1965; Mitchell, 2010). The three indicators are all measurements of a 
regime product, but also importantly located at different stages of the effect-chain of the 
regime: “Output” can be associated with attributes of the regime formed; “outcome” to 
regime implementation/behavioral change; and “impact” to the state of environmental quality 
(Underdal, 2002b, p. 7). The use of indicators has implication for causality in that the shorter 
the causal chain linking a regime and its effects, the easier it is to demonstrate causality, this 
is shown in Figure 3 below. In the following sub-sections each indicator will be clarified in 
some depth.  
 
Figure 3: Indicator Associations with the Regime Chain of Causality  
 
 
 
2.3.1.    First Indicator of Effectiveness: Output 
Output is the first and fundamental effect of an international regime, as it refers to the 
created set of rules and regulations produced by the regime. It is productive to explore the 
dynamic institutional system of the regime through endogenous attributes, as the design of the 
regime will have important implications for effectiveness (Young, 2010). The output indicator 
can be analyzed at two levels of analysis: i) the norms, principles, and rules of the 
international regime, or ii) as measured by the laws, policies, and regulations that are adopted 
 Formation           Implementation/Behavioral Change        Environmental Quality 
 
(Output)  (Outcome)  (Impact) 
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at the state level as a response to the requirements of the international regime (Mitchell, 2010, 
p. 148). Mainly for reasons of parsimony, the present study will focus on the level of the 
international regime. Such an analysis using these criteria can be completed by using data 
available in the official texts of the regimes, such as the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC and the 
Montreal Protocol. 
The general principles for effective institutional governance have been established 
through numerous empirical studies on international environmental regimes (Dietz, 2003).  
Individual authors have established a variety of suggestions for how to conceptualize these 
attributes. Wettestad (1999, p. 9), for example, uses a framework whereby output is examined 
in terms of four aspects: the ambitiousness, the legal status, the specificity, and the 
differentiation between the diversity of parties of the agreement(s). Underdal proposes that 
the criterion for the output indicator can be: the stringency of rules and regulations, the extent 
to which the system of activities targeted is in fact brought under its jurisdiction or domain, 
and the level of collaboration established (Underdal, 2002b, p. 6). The criteria and parameters 
for output at the international level are operationalized in this study as following and are 
returned to in chapter four. 
Within the output approach to regime-effectiveness, the assumption is that (i) the 
greater share of world emissions are accounted for in the agreement/the more states have 
ratified the treaty (Wettestad 1999, p. 10); (ii) the closer the abatement targets are aligned 
with scientific recommendations; (iii) the more legally binding and politically committing the 
treaty is (Ibid.); (iv) the better the funding mechanism; (v) the stronger the monitoring, 
reporting and verification of national policies are (Breitmeier, et al., 2006, p. 197); (vi) the 
existence of sanctioning mechanisms in case of implementation-failure (Ibid.); and (vii) the 
existence of a scientific body responsible for the systematic dissemination of data and 
reporting (Breitmeier, et al., 2006, p.195), the more effective the international regime in 
question is. This analysis of this indicator assigns sub-indicators equal weight in its 
contribution to effectiveness of the indicator. In Table 1, the output indicators for regime 
effectiveness are presented in the operationalized and vital form. This will be the basis so for 
the collection of empirical data and data analysis.
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Table 1: Operationalization of the Output Indicator 
 
Output Indicators for Regime Effectiveness  
Ambitiousness  
o Share of world emissions accounted for in the agreement 
o How targets compare with scientific recommendations  
Legal Status  
o Whether commitment declarations of intent are legally binding in international law? 
o Number of ratified countries 
Differentiation (different targets and timetables that account for the various types of actors, taking 
into account variation in parties particular conditions) 
 
Other Attributes of Institutional Design  
o Decision making rules  
o Funding mechanisms  
o Monitoring, reporting and verification mechanisms  (e.g. review of national policies) 
o Sanctioning mechanisms to apply in case of implementation failure 
o Scientific body with systematic dissemination of data and reporting, scientific review 
mechanism 
 
2.3.2.    Second Indicator of Effectiveness: Outcome 
The presence of an international regime does not guarantee the proper implementation 
of targets, principles, rules and action-strategies by the member states. This suggests a 
limitation on the validity of the output-indicator (Seter, 2011). In order to strengthen validity, 
one needs to account for the level of implementation of the regime’s output by examining 
behavioral change following its implementation. This is the outcome indicator (C. Helm & D. 
Sprinz, 2000, p. 633). Although the quality and characteristics of the regime goals as codified 
in the treaty (output) arguably are necessary or contributing prerequisites for the regime’s 
ability to influence the state’s behavioral change, an alternate way to measure effectiveness is 
to measure implementation behavior (emission behavior) either at the level of the member-
state, or at the aggregate level (collective emission-patterns) (Seter, 2011).  
Using this indicator may have three advantages over the output and impact indicators, 
as highlighted by Mitchell (2008). First, behavioral change is essential for achieving goals of 
improved environmental quality, which is the primary target for most international 
environmental regimes (Underdal, 2004, p. 34). Secondly, the outcome indicator is closer in 
the causal chain to the institution than environmental quality. There are fewer explanations for 
behavioral change than environmental quality (Mitchell, 2008, p. 84). Thirdly, data on 
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behavioral change is easy to accurately model and behavioral data is readily available and of 
higher caliber (Ibid.).   
For reasons of parsimony, this study operationalizes outcome as change in emission 
behavior at the level of the aggregate measure accounting for the collective emission behavior 
of all members of the regime in question. In the case of the Climate Regime this entails 
changes in collective GHG emissions of parties to the Kyoto Protocol at 5percent below 1990 
emissions levels, or a stabilization of emissions for Parties to the UNFCCC. For the Ozone 
Regime this entails the changes in or phasing out of emissions of the 96 regulated ODSs. In 
previous research the outcome indicator has been recommended and employed as an indicator 
of regime effectiveness by several scholars (Helm & Sprinz, 2000; Mitchell, 2004; Seter, 
2011; Underdal & Young, 2004). 
 
Table 2: Operationalization of the Outcome Indicator 
 
2.3.3.    Third Indicator of Effectiveness: Impact  
After regulations have been created by the regime (output), and behavioral changes 
have been observed and translated to an aggregate change in collective emissions or use of 
destructive substances (outcome), the final evidence of a regime’s effectiveness will be 
improvement in the environmental quality targeted for regulation. The impact indicator 
measures this aggregate improvement in biophysical conditions. 
 Use of the environmental impact indicator can be a particularly good measurement for 
measuring the regime effectiveness in the case where the environmental problem has an 
anthropogenic source, such as for ozone layer depletion and climate change (Mitchell 2008, p. 
87). Thus, measuring the drivers of these problems (pollutants) can provide measurement for 
how well the regime performs. This is reflected in the targets of the regime as well, which 
may include environmental quality targets in regulatory framework (Mitchell 2008, p. 86). 
Even if targets are directed at behavioral changes instead of environmental changes (i.e. 
emissions vs. concentration level), the goal of the regime is inherently based in improving the 
environment.  
 
Outcome Indicators for Regime Effectiveness  
o Are emission trends in accordance to the regulatory framework (Convention and/or Protocol)? 
o Have aggregate global emissions decreased subsequent to the formation of the regime? 
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A caveat to the use of this indicator is that environmental changes can be difficult to 
measure because of technical and scientific complications, and the time lag that exists 
between implementation and observed change (IPCC, 2007a). For climate change, the time-
lag problem is particularly complex, as the slowing and ultimate reversal of anthropogenic 
climate change is related to the decomposition of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere 
which can take over 120 years (IPCC, 2007a). For more complex GHGs such as HFC-23 the 
process of can take 220 years (WMO, 2010).  For the ozone regime, similar difficulties arise 
as the regulated chemicals are long lasting in the atmosphere and it may take decades for the 
ozone layer to be replenished to pre-1980 levels (Parson, 1993; WMO, 2010b).  
The impact indicator in this study is operationalized in both regimes as the 
atmospheric concentration of i) chlorine and bromine or ii) CO2 (for each respective regime). 
Both regime effectiveness classifications will utilize additional measurements to supplement 
the impact indicator evaluation. To measure the potential impact of the climate change 
regime, available data on the impacts of climate change will be presented in terms of observed 
change in atmospheric concentration of GHGs, change in global mean temperature, from the 
period of 1992-2008, or the most recent data available. The environmental impact of the 
ozone regime is measured via observed change in atmospheric concentration of ODS and 
change in the amount of ozone, such as in the size of the ozone hole in the Arctic and 
Antarctic from the period of 1987-2008, or the most recent data available.   
 
Table 3: Operationalization of the Impact Indicator  
 
Impact Indicators for Regime Effectiveness  
 
o Concentration (ppm) of CO2‐equivalent GHG in the atmosphere or chlorine/bromine (ppb) 
o Observation of change in environmental quality  
 
2.4.    “Fourth Debate”: Explaining Variation in Regime 
Effectiveness  
In this section, consideration is given to how regime effectiveness can be explained. 
The evaluation of the level of regime effectiveness begins as the stepping-stone for 
explanation of effectiveness. This thesis does not venture to explain the effectiveness of 
regimes, but for the sake of theoretical comprehensiveness a brief review of potential 
explanatory framework is presented below. The importance of this lies in the close 
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relationship in previous academic research between assessment of effectiveness and 
explanation.  
There have been several approaches to arguing explanatory variables of regime 
effectiveness. Ostrom (1990) early on identified that both institutional and non-institutional 
(exogenous) factors influence regime effectiveness. Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1993) 
identified three general factors as governmental concern, political and administrative capacity, 
and contractual environment (Keohane, et al.,1993). Breitmeier and colleagues concluded that 
discourse, legitimacy, and habit are important factors (Breitmeier, et al., 2006). However, the 
project by Miles et al. (2002) outlined the explanatory framework that will be briefly 
presented here. The approach is also utilized by the so-called Oslo-Potsdam solution (Hovi, 
Sprinz, & Underdal, 2003). Here, factors are grouped into three clusters: i) the nature of 
problem; ii) characteristics of the groups of parties; and iii) properties of the regime itself 
(Underdal, 2004, p. 40).  The explanatory model will be elaborated on below.  
2.4.1.    Problem Severity  
Given the breadth of problems addressed by international regimes, it is natural to 
expect a variety of problems that exist in varying levels of severity. The level of severity, 
described by Underdal as “benign” or “malign” (Underdal, 2004, p. 21), can also be classified 
within two dimensions: an intellectual dimension (scientific uncertainty) and a political 
dimension (deep-rooted conflicts) (Underdal, 2004). A benign problem is characterized by 
“scientific certainty, coordination, symmetry, and cross-cutting cleavages,” while a malign 
problem is characterized by scientific uncertainty, incongruity, asymmetry, and cumulative 
cleavages” (Ibid.). It follows that the nature of the problem can theoretically dictate such 
factors as cost and vulnerability, thereby making the problem either easier or more difficult to 
solve (Mitchell, 2010, p.173).  
2.4.2.    Properties of the Regime Itself   
Finally, regime effectiveness is also dependent on the problem-solving capacity of the regime 
(Fermann, 1997). Problem-solving capacity is operationalized by the following two factors: 
the institutional setting, and the amount of skill and technique that are available to politically 
engineer a cooperative solution (Seter, 2011; Underdal, 2002, p. 23). Although the 
institutional setting is composed of a number of factors, Underdal argues the most important 
determinants for an institutional setting are decision rules and procedures. Other factors of 
institutional setting can be both related to the protocol or rules of the convention, or how the 
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institution operates (Seter, 2011; Underdal, 2004).  Procedures, arenas, or facilities create 
space for parties to develop consensus, knowledge, and shared beliefs (Underdal, 2004, p.41). 
Institutional capacity can include instruments or mechanisms that bring parties into the 
process, and which may enhance cooperative decision making processes (Jørgen Wettestad, 
2002, p. 165). 
2.4.3.    Characteristics of the Groups of Parties 
A third set of variables explaining regime effectiveness relates to the idea that some 
groups of actors have a greater potential for collective action than others (Underdal, 2004, 
p.41). How actor’s capacity is operationalized varies. Ostrom (1995) suggests that social 
capital may be important, while others focus on the formal organization, social relations 
within the group, and the distribution of power. In addition, instrumental leadership can 
facilitate regime formation and implementation, and the more availability to resources a 
leader has may enhance the ability of states to encourage others to comply with the regime 
(Aggarwal, 1983, p. 620; Underdal, 2002b, p. 35). The leadership may arise from a variety of 
sources: officers of intergovernmental organizations, conference or working group chairs, 
national delegates, transnational organization or informal networks (Underdal, 2002).  
The reality of the researcher’s situation is that explaining regime effectiveness requires 
a complex assortment of variables for which a specific and definite pattern may be difficult to 
discern. Most research in the field is therefore based on case studies, thus the categorization 
presented above should be considered a way to simplify an otherwise highly complex set of 
variables. In addition, recent research in the area of regime interaction and interplay has called 
into question how regimes affect each other’s effectiveness, which adds further complexity to 
explaining effectiveness. Although explaining the level of regime effectiveness is the not the 
specific goal of this thesis, these concepts will be carried throughout the thesis in their 
importance for framing questions for future research frontiers. Thus far in chapter two we 
have addressed the four “debates” in addition to operationalizing the important indicators of 
regime effectiveness: output, outcome, and impact. We now leave discussion about conditions 
for regime effectiveness, and move to a review of how regime effectiveness can be assessed. 
To do this, I will review the standards by which one can determine whether a regime is low, 
medium, or high level of effectiveness. 
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2.5.    Having Decided Upon Indicators of Regime Effectiveness, 
Which Standard of Success Can Be Applied to an Empirical 
Study? 
 
 In section 2.3, the indicators which operationalize effectiveness in this study were 
argued for and defined. Drawing upon this operationalization further, the current section 
reviews the scholarly debate on the methods through which one can assign a level of 
effectiveness within each one of the three indicators reasoned (output, outcome, impact). This 
section defines how the regime’s indicators will be evaluated against a standard, or threshold 
of success. This section provides insight as to how the indicators of effectiveness (output, 
outcome, and impact) to how the level of effectiveness is classified with a standardized score 
(Underdal, 2002b, p.4). This section is split into two parts. A review of the literature on this 
topic presents an array of potential standards and their pros and cons in use. The second 
section presents the standards of effectiveness utilized in this study.  
 The indicators (output, outcome, impact) structure the collection of data by 
measuring three aspects of regime effectiveness. The question, however, is: how does one 
know when the indicator is indicating effectiveness? In order to assign a score of 
effectiveness, it is necessary to establish a standard of evaluation such that deviation along 
this standard can be classified. In this study, the term for this will be “standard,” but is also 
referred to by Mitchell (2008) as the ‘performance scale,’ while Underdal (2004, p.37) applies 
the term “yardstick.”  According to Underdal (2004, p.37 and 2002, p.7) when designing the 
standard, it must have the two following attributes: i) a point of reference against which actual 
performance can be compared, and ii) a common metric of measurement that can be applied 
across a wide range of cases. In this section, the point of reference - or standard - will be 
discussed and determined for this study. 
 Addressing this standard of how to evaluate effectiveness within each one of the 
three indicators has been, in recent years, commonly approached from a normative 
perspective. As Young (2008, p.21) states: “There is an essential normative component in the 
assignment of standards to the question of performance that is not present in the question of 
causality.” Three types of standards have been proposed by a variety of scholars (Hovi et al., 
2003; Young, 2003; Breimeier et al., 2006; Helm & Sprinz 2000): ‘goal attainment,’ ‘problem 
solving,’ ‘collective optimum,’ or through the use of a counterfactual (Mitchell, 2008, p.88).  
 The goal attainment approach assesses progress made towards the institution’s 
stated goals. Institution creators adopt standards that vary along a continuum of ambitious to 
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unambitious, largely reliant upon factors discussed in the above section. However, an 
evaluation of whether the regime has managed to meet its own standards is interesting and 
relevant in and of itself. Institutional goals are the result of political compromise between the 
institution’s actors, whose individual goals may have otherwise varied (Ibid.). The problem 
solving approach,  on the other hand, assesses progress in the regime as the originators of the 
institution defined it, but not those implied in the institutional ambitions (Mitchell, 2008; 
Breitmeier, et al., 2006). The problem solving approach will not be utilized or discussed 
further in this study.  
 The collective optimum approach is assessed by progress towards an “ideal” or 
“perfect” solution to the problem (Hovi, et al., 2003). This standard is based on the definition 
of the problem and what the optimal solution would be for the given problem (Mitchell, 2008, 
p.89). Mitchell suggests that using this form of standard has advantages because it allows 
assessment of the institution to be independent from the goals the institution’s self-defined 
bounds. Also, the standard can be applied across institutions, as it does not depend on the 
individual institution (Mitchell, 2008, p.89). A challenge in using the collective optimum, 
however, calls into question: who defines the optimal resolution of the problem or the 
collective optimum (Mitchell, 2008, p. 89)? The inherent nature of politics is that academic 
analysts, scientists, policy makers, or non-governmental organizations will unlikely 
unanimously agree on the best possible solution.  
  Another standard for regime effectiveness is the use of a counterfactual, where the 
standard is a hypothetical state of what would otherwise have happened if the regime had not 
existed. The counterfactual and the collective optima differ in their points of departure. Using 
the counterfactual allows for assessment against a potentially ‘poor’ standard (the pre, non-
regime situation – also termed in some research as Business As Usual), while the collective 
optimum measures not just improvement from a non-regime situation, but progress towards a 
perfect situation. Both require hypothetical projections: one of a world in which no regime 
existed, and the other deciding what the optimal solution looks like. For example, measuring 
the output indicator along the counterfactual standard will consistently yield positive scores as 
the presence of treaties, statues, regulations, etc. would not have occurred in the absence of 
the regime (Young, 2008, p. 19). For some, this makes the counterfactual less difficult to 
imagine. Breitmeier and colleagues (2006) for example, when measuring problem solving as a 
variable, chose to measure relative improvements from a counterfactual state instead of using 
a collective optimum because they were not able to codify the optimum (Breitmeier, et al., 
2006, p.31).  
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 One method that has been discussed heatedly in the field is what can be called the 
Oslo-Potsdam solution (Hovi, et al., 2003). This solution utilizes a scale that ranks the 
outcome that would have occurred in absence of the regime - the counterfactual (0) and 
between what is designated as the collective optimum (1). Regime effectiveness is rated 
relative to both standards in this approach (Hovi, et al., 2003). This makes the approach a 
synthesis of ‘distance to the collective optimum’ and ‘relative improvement’ (Wettestad, 
1999, p.8). Although this solution is theoretically appealing, it will not be utilized in this 
study for two reasons: first, it has been debated in the field amongst a variety of scholars and 
has not been adopted as the optimal measurement of effectiveness, but rather as a second-best 
substitute for the perfect solution that does not exist (Hovi, et al., 2003; Young, 2003, p. 102). 
Second, in this study, the counterfactual is not utilized, as it is difficult to predict what would 
have happened in the absence of a regime2 (Young, 2003, p.98; Hovi et al. 2003). In the 
following paragraphs, a description of the standards for regime effectiveness employed in this 
study will be presented. These standards will be utilized in the analytical framework and 
applied in chapter four.  
 In this study, the designed standard of effectiveness is three-fold and dependent on 
the indicator. This is due to reasons of parsimony and an evaluation of which dimension was 
the best fit for each indicator. The type of data included in each indicator is suitable to a 
specific form of standard. The justifications for why the indicators used in the analytical 
framework was presented previously in the chapter. The question at hand now is: how does 
one know when the indicator presents a story of effectiveness? This study utilizes two forms 
of standards discussed: the goal attainment standard and the collective optimum standard. The 
operationalizations of the standards for evaluation of output, outcome, and impact are 
different, yet the purpose of each standard is to complete an evaluation of effectiveness that 
stands against the most ambitious standards of meeting the best possible outcome for the 
planet. What is gained from using the most collectively optimal solution possible is twofold. 
First, it provides a common metric measurement enabling comparison between the two 
regimes. Second, the collective optimum inherently inspires a goal-setting perspective, 
inspiring future-looking consideration of the regime. 
                                                
2 The counterfactual presented by both Sprinz and Helm (2000; 1999) and Hovi et al. (2003) has foundations in 
the game theoretic method, which is admitted by even the authors themselves to not be an optimal method 
(Young 2003, p. 98). Although it is difficult to estimate counterfactuals, the Scientific Assessment Panel of the 
Ozone Trends Panel has come far in producing counterfactuals for what would have happened to ODS emissions 
had the Montreal Protocol not been present. These projections are useful, but in the case of this study, a similar 
counterfactual is lacking for the International Climate Change Regime and therefore is not a useful comparison.  
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 As has been discussed above, the design of a collective optimum solution is a 
contested process, and cannot be utilized in all situations. Regardless of the difficulty of the 
task, designing a standard is necessary for inter-regime comparison – which is at the core of 
my two-case comparison of regime effectiveness.  Underdal (2004, p.37) emphasizes that a 
cross-examination of multiple regime case studies remains a largely unscientific matter 
without the use of a “common unit of effectiveness.” As mentioned in the introduction of this 
thesis, the important point is that it should be transparent as to how one arrives at the given 
conclusion (Ibid.).  The specific standards for each indicator are clarified and defined below 
in seeking the goal of transparency.  
 First, the output indicator is measured against a standard of collective optimum 
that has been identified and operationalized in section 2.3.1. The standard was created based 
on theoretical and empirical findings from political science literature on regime effectiveness 
field from the past decades (see section 2.4). In chapter four, the empirical findings along this 
indicator are assessed according to the presence of the determined attributes of the regime. 
For each attribute deemed important, a score is assigned. This indicator is the most reliant on 
political science theory and academic research on institutional design. The indicator 
operationalization is reliant on previous explanatory research that has determined which 
aspects of the regime are significant in contributing to effectiveness.  
 Second, the outcome indicator is measured against the goal attainment standard. 
This will assess the level of implementation of the regime’s output by examining behavioral 
change subsequent to regime formation against the standard of the targets and goals set by the 
regime. This sheds light on how the regime is meeting its self-described goals (Mitchell, 
2008). This standard is founded in the political agreements of the regime itself, thereby 
drawing upon the collectively negotiated terms for what countries have deemed the best 
solution politically possible. The assessment of the outcome indicator can also be completed 
through measuring the current behavioral trends with those that are suggested by scientific 
research to be necessary in order to meet the most optimal environmental quality. For reasons 
of parsimony, the evaluation of level of ambition is included in the output effectiveness 
assessment, rather than in the outcome effectiveness evaluation.  
 Third, the impact indicator will be assessed against a standard consisting of the 
recommendations from the scientific assessments produced by the international academic 
community. This standard is firmly rooted in science and the idea that scientific knowledge 
has the ability to estimate the best possible situation for the planet .The recommended and 
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scientific ideal quality of biophysical conditions serve as the best fit for a measurement 
against the current situation.  
 The figure below depicts how the analytical framework is utilized in this study. 
Phase I, which occurs in chapter three, is where empirical mapping of the data needed for 
analyzing regime effectiveness occurs. In Phase II (chapter four) each indicator is compared 
against the designated standards in completing a classification of regime effectiveness for 
each indicator. After this classification is completed, it is then possible for a comparison of 
regime effectiveness (Phase III), which occurs in chapter four. The standards presented in this 
section are an integral aspect of the analysis. This is shown in the figure below. In chapter 
three the empirical findings are investigated prior to the analysis in chapter four.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3: Analytical Framework and Process of Evaluating Regime Effectiveness  
Phase I:  
Empirical Findings, (as presented 
in Chapter 3) along the 
parameters of each Indicator 
(Output, Outcome, Impact)   In Phase II, the Analytical Framework is employed, 
utilizing the standards presented in the above 
section (2.5) and which are depicted in this table:  
  
Indicator 
 
Standard by which 
Indicator is Assessed  
Output  Ideal Institutional 
Design 
Outcome  Goal Attainment 
Impact  Scientific Advice  
 
Phase II:  
Analysis of Regime Effectiveness 
according to each indicator; level 
of effectiveness assessed by 
distance on the standard.  (Ch.4) 
Phase III:  
After each regime is classified in 
terms of Regime Effectiveness, a 
comparison between the two 
regimes’ levels of effectiveness 
is possible. (Ch. 4) 
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3.    Empirical Mapping: What is the Empirical Status of 
the International Regimes of Climate Change and Ozone 
Depletion?  
 
In the present chapter, relevant data will be presented which will feed into the 
subsequent comparative, classificatory regime effectiveness analysis (chapter four). The two 
international environmental regimes of climate change and ozone layer share some 
similarities. Both regimes strive to solve problems in the atmosphere. Both solutions to these 
problems reside in preventing a specific set of anthropogenic chemicals or pollutants from 
being emitted and harming the atmosphere, and thereby the planet’s inhabitants. The regimes 
both began with framework conventions that evolved by means of adding protocols and 
amendments. Finally, both regimes share a unique characteristic distinguishing them from 
other regimes in that the problems are exemplar of those of the global commons.  
For each regime, the nature of the problem will first be briefly presented. Second, a 
summary of what the scientific and political community has recommended as being the most 
optimal solution for environmental quality will be presented.  Third, the historical 
development of the regime will be presented by briefly describing the historical development 
of international regulation and cooperation and the subsequent formation of the regime, with a 
focus on the institutional attributes, norms, and principles of the regime. Fourth, the trends of 
emission behavior subsequent to the formation of the regime are presented. Finally, evidence 
of any changes in the environmental quality will presented, with focus of those subsequent to 
the regime formation in focus. Due to space and clarity, this chapter will review only the data 
vitally necessary for the analysis of regime effectiveness. Where possible, the sources for 
more information will be referred to for future research. This threefold documentary forms the 
basis for the threefold evaluation of regime-effectiveness (output, outcome, impact) in chapter 
four.  
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3.1.    Ozone Depletion Regime: Problem Description, Regime 
Attributes,  Emission Trends, and Environmental Change 
3.1.1.    The nature of the problem  
Ozone is a molecule made of three oxygen atoms (O3) in gaseous concentration that 
protects life on earth by absorbing harmful ultraviolet B radiation from the sun. Ninety 
percent of ozone resides in the stratosphere approximately 20-40km above the Earth’s 
surface, the second layer of the atmosphere (above the troposphere) (Andersen, 2005). 
Without the ozone layer, UV-B radiation increases which has many adverse impacts such as 
increasing the chance of melanoma and non-melanoma skin cancers, more eye cataracts, 
weakened immune systems, reduced plant yields, damage to ocean ecosystems and reduced 
fishing yields, adverse effects on animals, and damage to plastics (UNEP, 2005).  
It was first in the early 1970s that scientists hypothesized that a group of man-made 
chemicals called chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) could deplete ozone (Rowland & Molina, 1975; 
Skodvin, 2000b).(Rowland & Molina, 1975; Skodvin, 2000b). CFCs are chemically stable 
and persist long enough in the troposphere to be able to diffuse across the boundary to the 
stratosphere. These chemicals are broken down by UV-B to release chlorine and bromine 
atoms that act as a catalyst in the destruction of ozone molecules in the atmosphere (Parson, 
1993).  
The chemicals are anthropogenic in their origin and purpose. They were designed in 
1928 for commercial products such as coolants in air conditioning and electronic components, 
or for flexible and rigid foam increased by the mid 1970s. In 1974, aerosol propellants 
accounted for 70percent of the global amount of CFC production (Andersen, et al., 2005). In 
addition to CFCs, scientists later discovered other ozone depleting substances (ODS) such as 
halons (fire suppressant), carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, and methyl bromide 
(Chasek, Downie, & Brown, 2010). More recently, research has shown that most ozone 
depleting substances (now regulated under the Montreal Protocol) are also greenhouse gasses 
with an often high global warming potential (GWP). Not only do ozone depleting substances 
contribute to climate change, but scientists today are also concerned about the impact of 
increasing temperatures on ozone depletion itself – it is relatively unknown what effects the 
changing climate will have on the atmosphere’s operations. There is research showing that 
holes in the Arctic and Antarctic, for example, both currently respond to and contribute to 
changes in temperature and climate (WMO, 2011).  
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3.1.2.    The Earth’s Threshold for Ozone Depletion and Scientific 
Advice on the Solution to the Problem 
When Molina and Rowland first estimated the extent of damage due to ozone layer 
depletion, they calculated that if CFC production were to rise at the (1974) rate of 10 percent 
a year until 1990 and then leveled off, that up to 50 percent of the ozone layer would be 
destroyed by 2050. They estimated that this would cause up to 80,000 additional cases of skin 
cancer per year in only the United States, as well as other effects to crop damage, climate 
change, and genetic mutations (Molina & Rowland, 1975). Initial research conducted in the 
United States concluded in a 1979 report that for populations susceptible to sunlight, the skin 
cancer rate would be higher in conditions where ozone was depleted. At this time it was 
expected that without action taken, the estimated 16percent reduction in ozone would 
translate to several thousand more cases of melanoma a year, some potentially fatal. Concern 
was also centered on reduced crop yields, negative effects on larval forms of seafood species 
and species at the base of the marine food chain, and climatic effects (Andersen, et al., 2005). 
In 1982 estimates were becoming more exact as research increased. At this point it was also 
observed that UV-B radiation had been demonstrated to cause immunological changes in 
animals and it was expected to potentially occur in humans. Radiation also results in stunted 
plant growth, cuts on total leaf area, reductions in production of dry matter, and can inhibit 
photosynthesis (Andersen, et al. 2005). Evidence of a growing hole in the Antarctic ozone 
layer was first noticed in 1981, but was not taken as anything more than erroneous data until 
1982 (Gribbin, 1988) and was not published until 1985 (Andersen, et al., 2005).  
In 1985, it was predicted that if CFC release rate were to become twice the amount of 
1985 levels, there would be a 3-12 percent reduction of the ozone column, independent of 
other changes in carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane (Andersen, et al., 2005). By the 
time of the publication of the first Scientific Assessment Panel (SAP) in November 1989, 
enough evidence had been building that scientists were able to make more confident 
recommendations for what type of emissions reductions were needed in order to avoid the 
most drastic effects.  
“Even if control measures of the Montreal Protocol were to be implemented by all nations, today’s 
atmospheric abundance of chlorine (about 3 parts per billion by volume) will at least double to triple in 
the next century. If the atmospheric abundance of chlorine reaches about 9 parts per billion by volume 
by 2050, ozone depletions of 0-4 percent in the tropics and 4-12 percent at high latitudes would be 
predicted, even without including the effects of heterogeneous chemical processes known to occur in 
polar regions.”  (UNEP, 1989, p. 6) 
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Based on this report, the SAP concluded that complete elimination of ODS emissions were 
what was needed to return the Antarctic ozone layer to levels of the pre-1970s, and hence to 
avoid the ozone dilution effect that the Antarctic ozone hole could have at other latitudes 
(UNEP, 1989). In this report, it was suggested that all fully halogenated CFCs, halons, carbon 
tetrachloride, methyl chloroform and a “careful consideration of the HCFC substitutes” 
should be considered for elimination of emissions (UNEP, 1989). The justification for this 
came in 1989 from specifics in the Environmental Effects Assessment Panel. In addition, the 
Technology Review Panel in 1989 concluded it was technically feasible to decrease the 
production and consumption of the five controlled CFCs, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl 
chloroform by at least 95 per cent (UNEP, 1989, p. 9). The concept and justification for 
phase-out of chemicals thus began in 1989. In the following section, how the international 
regime developed politically is reviewed.  
3.1.3.  Institutional Background: Formation and Structure of the Regime  
International interest in the matter of ozone depletion escalated in the mid 1970s as 
scientific understanding of the CFC’s potential to deplete the ozone layer grew. The formation 
of the regime started in the late 1970s in the form of international negotiations between 
groups of countries, but nothing was formally agreed upon until 19853. During this time, 
evidence and research on the ozone regime fluctuated and grew, with it a variety of political 
interest and commitment on the matter as well (Parson, 1993). The Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985) was signed into being by 20 countries plus the 
European Community (Wettestad, 2002). The Convention was a loose framework, the 
looseness of which was criticized by the ambitious countries that had hoped for a legally 
binding protocol. Shortly after the adoption of the Convention, however, UNEP convened 
negotiations for the following two years, eventually leading to the Montreal Protocol in 1987 
(Wettestad, 2002). Regardless of the Protocol’s ratification, the political structure and 
functioning bodies of the regime are dually reliant on both the Convention and the Protocol. 
 The targets of the Montreal Protocol were first negotiated from 1985 to 1987. In 1986, 
the United States’ lead negotiating position was an immediate freeze in CFC consumption, 
                                                
3 The United States, Norway, Sweden and Canada banned nonessential use of CFCs in aerosols in the late 1970s 
(Parson 1993). The first international initiative took place in 1977 in the form of a United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP) meeting on ozone. The meeting resulted in a “World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer” that 
coordinated research taken by national and international agencies through the “Coordinating Committee on the 
Ozone Layer” (CCOL), which until 1982 remained the governing body on the issue (Skodvin 2000b). 
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followed by phased reductions to zero, and scientific review to determine whether the cuts 
were adequate or not. Earlier in 1986, it had been announced that substitutes could be 
available within five years given the right market conditions, despite the fact that the 
substitutes would be two to five times more costly to produce (Parson, 1993). Despite slow 
progress due largely to dissent by the European Community, by April 1987 a draft text was 
produced as the basis for the Montreal Protocol (Parson, 1993). The final agreement consisted 
of 50 percent cuts from 1986 levels of production and consumption of the five principal CFCs 
by 1999; in addition to a freeze in 1990 and a 20 percent cut in 1994. Three halons were 
frozen at 1986 levels starting from 1993. The total production and consumption of CFCs and 
halons were determined by measuring each chemical by its ozone depleting potential (ODP) 
(The Montreal Protocol, 1987). The Montreal Protocol was to enter into force upon receiving 
eleven ratifications representing two-thirds of 1986 CFC consumption. This happened on 
January 1, 1989 with thirty parties representing 83 percent of global consumption (Parson, 
1993).  
The protocol distinguishes in multiple ways between countries and recognizes 
differences in level of consumption and production of ODSs. Developing countries operate 
under Article 5 of the Protocol, whereby countries whose annual consumption was less than 
0.3 kg per capita received a ten-year grace period and other nations could increase production 
limits by 10 percent for export to meet these countries’ “basic domestic needs” (The Montreal 
Protocol, Article 5, 1987). Countries producing less than 25,000 metric tons per year could 
transfer their production quotas to other parties for the purpose of industrial rationalization 
(UNEP, 2009, p. 6). In the 1990 London amendment, developing countries were further 
considered and measures that discriminated against them were revised (Parson, 1993). In 
addition, financial and technology transfer provisions were implemented in partial benefit for 
these countries, most notably the Multilateral Fund (UNEP, 2009; Parson 1993).  
As with many international environmental regimes, science has an integral role in the 
regime (Haas, et al., 1993). The Conference of Parties (COP) to the Vienna Convention hosts 
a Meeting of Ozone Research Managers that meet every three years. The group, which is 
made up of government experts on atmospheric research, reviews relevant national and 
international research and monitoring and then produces a report to the COP. In addition, the 
Montreal Protocol established the Ozone Trends Panel which administers three panels of 
experts that meet at least one year prior to each assessment: a Scientific Assessment Panel, a 
Technology and Economics Assessment Panel, and an Environmental Effects Panel (WMO, 
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2010). Ad hoc groups on data and reporting and destruction technologies supplement these 
official panels (Wettestad, 2002, p.163).  
At the time of regime formation, science and research was quickly advancing (Parson, 
1993). Almost immediately after the Montreal Protocol was signed, new scientific 
information against CFCs was released, information that was channeled through the Ozone 
Trends Panel, the initial panel of the regime (Parson, 1993). Information in the WMO/UNEP 
Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion in 1989 on the status and expected future of the 
ozone hole was that the hole would fill when chlorine returned to 2 parts per billion, which – 
even with a global phase-out of CFCs - was not predicted to occur until 2060 (UNEP, 1989; 
Parson, 1993).  
These 1989 recommendations were taken into consideration in 1990 at the second 
meeting of the parties (MOP-2) in London. Here, amendments were made to the original 
Protocol that strengthened control measures and timetables for CFCs, halons, carbon 
tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, and nonbinding resolutions were made on other halons and 
the substitute HCFC (UNEP, 2009, p.16). At the 1992 meeting in Copenhagen (MOP-4), the 
evidence for ozone-layer depletion was growing increasingly grim and existing phase-outs 
were accelerated and controls added on other chemicals – including methyl bromide, 
commonly used as an insecticide (Parson, 1993; UNEP, 2009).  
Negotiations on methyl bromide (MeBr) would reoccur from this point forward as 
being controversial, largely because of its use in agriculture. The US and the EU advocated 
the acceleration of the phase-out of the chemical, but only within the context of a US loophole 
to the phase-out date of the chemical for critical use exemptions (CUE)4 in agriculture 
(Gareau, 2010, p. 226). This issue returned in 2003 at the MOP-15 in which parties were not 
able to resolve disagreements on requests for critical use exemptions (CUEs) for MeBr. 
Negotiations were suspended and taken up at an Extraordinary MOP, where disagreement 
prevailed on the matter of long term CUE beyond 2005. The disagreements continued into the 
MOP-16 in 2004, where the US led a veto that culminated in deadlock. By the MOP-18 there 
were fewer CUEs requested and the decision was made to defer consideration of the 
controversial elements in order to progress elsewhere (Chasek et al., 2010, p.174).   
At the MOP-9 in 1997 in Montreal, the phase-out date for MeBr was accelerated from 
2030 to 2005 (for details see Annex I). At MOP-9 the issue of illegal trade of CFCs was also 
addressed. The MOP-11 in Bejing agreed to phase out the newly developed 
                                                
4 This is not to be confused with the Montreal Protocol’s CFC “essential use exemption.”” 
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bromochloromethane, and strengthened controls on MeBr. The Bejing amendment also 
banned trade in HCFCs with countries that did not ratify the Copenhagen amendment, but that 
had introduced the HCFC phase-out at home (Chasek et al., 2010, p.170). HCFCs were again 
addressed in the MOP-19 in Montreal (2007). The phase-out, originally scheduled for 2030, 
was moved forward to 2020, for developing countries from 2040 to 2030. The decision was 
influenced by the pertinence of HCFC for climate change, as well as ozone depletion (Chasek 
et al., 2010, p.170).  
In the MOP in Doha, the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal 
Protocol was the subject of attention as developing countries needed assurance that the HCFC 
accelerated controls would be possible, as this was agreed upon in the MOP-19. The 2009 
MOP addressed the issue of destruction of ODS that are stored as waste, which will continue 
to be on the agenda for MOPs in the future, particular as such storage in developing countries 
becomes more common place as developing countries begin to phase out more chemicals 
(Chasek et al. 2010, p.174). 
 
Other Institutional Attributes of the Regime 
Technology transfer was integral to the process of switching from ODS such as CFCs, 
to HCFCs (and later HFCs). In Article 10a of the Protocol, transfer of technology is defined 
only in brief, as being supported by the Multilateral Fund in order to ensure that substitutes 
are “expeditiously transferred” to Article 5 parties and that it occur in fair and favorable 
conditions (UNEP, 2009, p.21). By 2007, more than 240 sectors with products dependent on 
ODS halted most uses within 10 years and were satisfied with the performance of substitutes 
(Andersen et al., 2007, p.46). A “significant” part of technology transfer occurred voluntarily 
through multinational companies, industrial associations (Andersen et al., 2007,p.295). 
However, a large part of technology transfer is accredited to the MLF, which accounts for the 
finance and support of 5520 projects (USD 2.1 billion) as of 2007 to 143 developing countries 
(Andersen et al., 2007, p.31) 
The compliance mechanisms of the Montreal Protocol are addressed in Article 7 
which demands parties report statistical data on production, imports, and exports (or amount 
used for feedstock or recycled, depending on the substance) of the controlled substances 
within three months of when the given substance control goes into force for the respective 
party (The Montreal Protocol, Article 7, 1987). Developing countries operate under Article 5 
of the Protocol and are required to submit data on the production, imports, exports, and 
consumption (use) by sector to the Secretariat (UNEP, 1999, p. 2).  
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In Article 8 of the Protocol it was recommended that at the first meeting of the Parties 
a non-compliance measure be determined, which now exists as the Non-Compliance Measure 
(UNEP, 2009, p.19). The Implementation Committee consisting of ten parties was established 
in 1990. At the Ninth Meeting in Montreal 1997, Parties recognized that the accurate, timely, 
and comprehensive reporting of data had emerged as a critical component of the Protocol and 
agreed to create a handbook that would assist parties in fulfilling their reporting obligations 
(Decision IX/28) (UNEP, 1999, p.1).  
The procedure follows such that National Ozone Units (NOUs) report to the 
Secretariat and the Secretariat reports the data to the Meeting of the Parties. Based on this, 
compliance is assessed by the Implementation Committee under the Non-Compliance 
Procedure of the Protocol (UNEP, 1999, p.3). Consequences of non-compliance can result in 
three measures i) assistance where appropriate, such as in the data reporting phase, technical 
assistance, technology transfer, financial assistance, or information training; ii) “issuing 
cautions;” ii) suspension of specific rights and privileges under the Protocol, in accordance 
with rules of international law (UNEP, 2009, p.506-508).  
The Montreal Protocol has evolved over time, facilitated in part by regime design. 
Evidence for this is the adjustment procedure for already controlled substances that does not 
require ratification process for some of the decisions made in the regime (Wettestad, 1999, 
p.159). Also, the Protocol demands review of regime regulations as stated in Article 6 of the 
Montreal Protocol: “Beginning in 1990, and at least every four years thereafter, the Parties 
shall assess the control measures provided for in Article 2 and Articles 2A to 2I on the basis 
of available scientific, environmental, technical and economic information” (The Montreal 
Protocol, Article 6, 1987) 
To date, the Montreal Protocol controls ninety-six chemicals. Annex I shows the most 
recent version of timetables and control measures for the most relevant ODSs. In the 
industrialized countries the following chemicals have been phased out: halons, CFCs, carbon 
tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, hydrobromofuorocarbons, bromochloromethane, and 
methyl bromide (with exceptions). In developing countries hydrobromofluorocarbons, 
bromochloromethane, CFCs, halons, carbon tetrachloride have been phased out as of 2010, 
while methyl chloroform and methyl bromide will be by 2015, and HCFCs by 2030. In 2009, 
the Protocol celebrated the 196 parties that have ratified the Montreal Protocol, making it 
officially universal (UNEP, 2009). Table 4 below summarizes the design and attributes of the 
international ozone regime. 
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Table 4: Summary of Regime Design and Attributes of the International Ozone Regime   
 
Form of output 
   
Vienna Convention 
(1985)  
Montreal Protocol (1987, 
enforce 1989) 
Amendments – current 
outcomes 
       
Number of countries 
ratified  
196   196  
Universal as of 2009  
Varies, ‐  
195, 192, 182, 167  
Share of global 
emissions covered 
N/A  Ratification by at least 
2/3 of global 
consumption of ODS by 
1986  
In 1989 accounted for 
83% 
Information 
unavailable, see phase‐
out timetables in  
Annex I. 
Mitigation commitments   No specific obligation –  
“The Parties shall take 
appropriate measures.. 
to protect human 
health and the 
environment against 
adverse effects 
resulting… from human 
activities which 
modify… 
the ozone layer” Article 
1 
Original:  
8 chemicals regulated, a 
50% reduction in CFCs 
from ‘86 baselevel by ’99. 
Halons were to be frozen 
at ‘86 base year in ’94.   
 
96 chemicals regulated 
to date  
(See Table 1 for full 
details on control 
measures) 
MOP1 (1990)‐ all CFCs 
and original Halons 
phased out by 2000.  
Non‐binding 
resolutions made on 
other halons and 
HCFCs.   
 
Legal status  
 
Not legally binding  Legally binding   Legally binding under 
the Montreal Protocol 
Long term goals, 
timetables 
Legal ability to create  
protocol and 
amendments  
Allows for amendments 
to original timetables, 
See phase‐out timetables 
in Table 1. Insert 
maximum years (original)  
Acceleration of 
timetables for phase 
outs occur at COPs of 
the Montreal Protocol 
Insert maximum year(s)  
Mechanisms for 
Technology transfer 
Nothing specific   Outlined in Article 10a‐ 
reliant on the Multilateral 
Fund 1 
 
Mechanisms for Finance   Nothing specific   Multilateral Fund for the 
Implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol 
 
Mechanisms for 
Compliance/Sanctioning  
Nothing specific   Trade sanctions, 
reporting requirements, 
Implementation 
committee assess 
compliance based on 
reporting; no penalties 
for non‐compliance 
  
 
3.1.4.    Emission trends subsequent to the formation of the ozone-layer 
protection-regime 
In the following section, emissions activity that has occurred after the regime’s outputs 
have been produced will be reviewed. A distinction between emissions and accumulation in 
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the atmosphere is important. Emissions of chemicals focuses on behavior as the source point 
where as accumulation refers to the actual presence of the chemicals in the atmosphere.  
  Prior to 1987, emissions of Ozone Depleting Substances were increasing at a 
substantial rate (WMO 2010). Of these, 90percent of emissions in 1986 were in the OECD 
countries (Andersen et al., 2005, p. 278). As is clear from Figure 4, after 1987 and the 
enactment of the Montreal Protocol, emissions of major ODSs decreased 85percent by 2005 
(Andersen et al. 2005). The worldwide production of CFCs fell from 1.1 million tons in 1986 
to 35,000 tons in 2006 (Chasek et al., 2010, p.176). HCFC emissions increased more rapidly 
than expected while CFCs decreased more 
slowly than expected. The reason for a slower 
CFC decline is due likely to emissions from so 
called “banks” of CFCs in appliances that are 
already produced, such as refrigerators, air 
conditioners, and foams. Carbon tetrachloride 
emissions also declined slowly over the past 
decade (WMO, 2010, p.1). 
Emissions are increasing of the first CFC 
substitute developed, the HCFC, which has a 
shorter lifetime and ODP than CFCs. Emissions 
of HCFC-22, increased 50percent faster in 
2007-2008 than in 2003-2004. HCFC-142b has 
increased about two times as fast. However, the 
total emissions of HCFCs are projected to begin 
to decline during the coming decade due to 
measures recently agreed to in the Montreal 
Protocol (WMO, 2010a, p. 2) 
A non-chlorine substitute – the HFC – is 
currently being phased-in instead of HCFC 
(Wettestad, 2002). While HFCs are non-ozone 
depleting, they have a longer life span and a 
higher GWP than the HCFCs they are 
substituting. CO2 equivalent emissions of HFCs 
are increasing by 8percent per year, which is 
 Figure 4: Emissions of ODS and their 
Substitutes (WMO, 2010a, p. 3) 
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expected to grow as HCFCs decline in the coming decade (WMO, 2010a, p. 2). HFC-23 (a 
byproduct of HCFC-22 production) has a particularly large GWP with a lifetime of about 220 
years. It is regulated under the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol’s clean development 
mechanism (WMO, 2010a, p. 3). It is expected that HFC emissions will increase, largely by 
Article 5 countries following an assumption that trends will follow what has been observed in 
developed countries. The increase in emissions is not only because of their substitution for 
CFC/HCFCs regulated in the Montreal Protocol, but combined with economic growth and an 
increase in living standards (Daniel, et al., 2010, p. 28). In Figure 4, the differences between 
ODP and GWP of ODSs are displayed, along with projections for emissions of the future and 
the respective ODP/GWP effect. 
3.1.5.  Environmental Change Subsequent to the Formation of the Ozone 
Regime 
1994-1995 was the peak of chlorine and bromine ODS species accumulation in the 
troposphere as is measured by equivalent chlorine (ECl), and a decline has been occurring 
since. This decrease is attributed to the decline of the short-lived methyl chloroform and 
somewhat to methyl bromide. At the time of the 2005 Assessment of Ozone Depletion, the 
abundance of ECl in the atmosphere had decreased 8percent from the maximum value seen in 
1992 and 1994 (WMO, 2006). In the 2010 Assessment, total tropospheric chlorine had 
declined from 2005-2008, albeit at a slower rate 5 than in previous years, and two thirds more 
slowly than expected (WMO, 2010)6. The peak of tropospheric abundance of chlorine from 
ODS and methyl chloride of 3.7ppb, had declined by 2008 to 3.4ppb (WMO, 2010a, p. 1). 
In addition, stratospheric levels of chlorine and bromine also declined during the 
period of 2005-2008 (WMO, 2010). As CFCs and halons have lifetimes of several decades to 
a few centuries, decline in stratospheric chlorine and bromine levels down to the values 
observed prior to 1980 will take decades to observe (WMO, 2010). This time lag is 
exemplified in the 14-20km layer of the Antarctic stratosphere where most of the ozone 
resides. Each year from late August to early October nearly all of the ozone is destroyed 
(WMO, 2010) despite apparent improvement mentioned above. Likewise, the Arctic ozone 
depletion often is highest during the spring of the past decades but is dependent on other 
factors such as atmospheric dynamics, transport, and temperature. In April 2011 the highest 
                                                
5 From 2007-2008 decreased at 14ppt, from 2003-2004 decreased at rate of 21ppt (Forster, 2010) 
6 This is likely due to the increasing HCFC and CFC banks emissions trends described in 3.1.3 
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recorded level of ozone column loss in the Arctic was recorded at 40percent (WMO, 2011). 
Thus, while chemical levels measured have slightly decreased, global ozone levels have not 
seen a substantial decrease or improvement since the minimum point in the mid-1990s 
(WMO, 2010).  
The slower than expected declines in accumulation are likely because of increases in 
HCFC emissions, and partially due to CFC banks. The HCFC and HFC substitutes have 
posed new questions for research on the interaction between these chemicals and increases in 
temperature in the troposphere (WMO, 2010). This will be discussed further in chapter four.  
3.1.6.  Summary of the International Ozone Regime Empirical Findings  
This presentation of the ozone layer depletion regime has encompassed the data 
necessary to assess regime effectiveness. The nature of ozone depletion has been portrayed as 
a problem first theorized about in the 1970s, and which was later proved to be occurring by 
the beginning of the 1980s. The science regarding ozone depletion was new at the time of 
regime formation, but new research provided evidence to both a growingly large emissions 
problem, and observations of the problem were confirmed (such as the presence of a hole in 
the ozone). In addition, research on potential impacts on human and natural ecosystems 
reiterated the importance of replenishing the ozone layer for life on earth. The holes in the 
ozone layer in the Antarctic and the Arctic have not decreased or increased in recent years.  
At the time of adoption of the Montreal Protocol, the science was not year clear on 
what was needed to restrict further depletion. However, evolving research corresponded with 
subsequent amendments and accelerations to the original timetables, calling for phase-outs for 
some chemicals in some countries. In addition, ODSs have been added for regulation as 
evidence arises of their potency increasing the extent of the overall regime’s reach. The 
regime has also had to address substitutions for the regulated ninety-six chemicals. These 
substitutes are currently the focus of the regime, both in terms of their increasing emissions 
and their relevance for the climate regime. Although emissions of ODS have decreased, as is 
evidenced by decreases in accumulation in the atmosphere of chlorine and bromine, progress 
has not occurred as quickly as expected. The regime is universally ratified, and targets exist 
for all countries, although developing countries have been given flexibility in achieving their 
targets. After having reviewed the ozone regime, in the following section the same process 
will be completed for climate change.  
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3.2.   Climate Change Regime: Problem Description, Regime 
Attributes, Emission Trends, and Environmental Change 
3.2.1.  The Nature of the Problem 
The ‘greenhouse effect’ is the earth’s natural method of warming the planet that is 
vital for maintaining a livable climate for the planet’s inhabitants. Anthropogenic increases in 
emission of gasses (known as greenhouse gasses – GHG) intensify the greenhouse effect and 
this is causing an overall increase in the Earth’s temperature resulting in changes in climate. 
Scientists have found that even small increases in temperature can cause large changes in 
climate, changes that have already been observed and are expected to increase (Chasek et al., 
2010; Le Treut et al., 2007). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change defines climate 
change as a “change in the state of the climate that can be identified by change in the mean 
and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, typically 
decades or longer” (Le Treut et al., 2007, p. 30).  
Climate change is a complex phenomenon within an already complex and dynamic 
climate system whereby multiple factors beyond greenhouse gasses contribute to its behavior 
(Young 2010). The field of atmospheric and earth science has grown since the 1980s but 
modeling and predictions are of yet exact, enhancing uncertainties regarding the effects of 
climate change. Additionally, the anthropogenic causes of climate change are complex in that 
they derive from multiple sources of multiple types of pollutant. The GHGs that have 
increased considerably since 1750 are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous 
oxide (N2O). In addition, increases in halocarbons such as peroflourinated hydrocarbons 
(PFCs), hydroflourocarbons (HFCs), and sulphur hexafluorideas (SF6), well as indirect 
greenhouse gasses such as SO2, NOx, CO and NMVOC. These gasses have differing impacts 
on the green house effect, which is described as Global Warming Potential (GWP). For 
example, methane and hydroflourocarbons have a higher GWP than carbon dioxide. 
However, carbon dioxide is the largest threat for global warming because it is emitted in such 
huge quantities due to the (burning) of fossil fuels, other GHG are referred to in research with 
their GWP in terms of carbon dioxide equivalent (UNFCCC, 2004).  
GHG emissions from the burning of fossil fuels accounts for 77 percent of all GHGs, 
while deforestation and methane emissions account for most of the remaining GHG emitted 
(Le Treut et al., 2007). Since the pre-industrial era, CO2 has increased in the atmosphere by 
30 percent, from 275 ppm to 369 ppm in 2008. Seventy-six percent of the world’s emissions 
of GHG originate from 20 countries (Bernstein et al., 2007, p. 37).  
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3.2.2.  The Earth’s Threshold for Climate Change and Scientific Advice 
on the Solution to the Problem 
Determining levels of what is dangerous for the Earth is based often on normative 
judgment rather than on science; however, this does not mean that science does not have ways 
of estimating, predicting, and modeling how the Earth will respond to anthropogenic change. 
There are two ways that the IPCC and policymakers generally operationalize the effects of 
climate change in the sense of earth’s capacity – one is concentration of GHG in the 
atmosphere (as presented in CO2 equivalent measurement) and the second is via temperature 
change. In the following section I will briefly review political and scientific recommendations 
for the threshold of these two effects before undesirable impacts of climate change occur.  
In the beginning of the climate regime in the late 1980s7, the available scientific 
information suggested that a 2 degree Celsius increase would be the maximum temperature 
before the risks for the most detrimental climate change effects would increase rapidly (IPCC, 
2007b, p. 99). In 2006, renowned climate scientist James Hansen concluded that warming of 
more than 1° C (relative to 2000) and a maximum CO2 at 450ppm would be “dangerous” in 
context of sea level rise and extermination of species (Hansen et al., 2006). In 2008, Hansen 
and colleagues updated their recommendation suggesting CO2 be reduced from the current 
385ppm (growing at 2ppm/year) to 350ppm in order to avoid irreversible ice sheet and 
species loss (Hansen et al., 2008). 350ppm is quickly becoming the targeted number by 
scientists and climate mitigation advocates. Most scientists certainly agree that it is critical 
that we prevent concentrations of GHG from rising above 540ppm, which is two times that of 
preindustrial levels (Young 2010, p. 83; Steffen et al., 2004). Variations on the number 
depend on calculations of the climate system’s slower feed back mechanisms, modeling 
decisions, and definition of the concept of “danger” for the Earth’s ecosystems and climate.  
Recommendations from an economic perspective can differ, even within the field. The 
Stern Review (Stern, 2006 ) argues that concentrations of GHG need to be stabilized below 
550ppm CO2 equivalent. Other authors have argued decisions regarding the cost benefit 
analysis of climate change are reliant upon decision on a particular discount rate (Nordhaus 
2007 (Nordhaus, 2007), thereby rendering policy decisions on what type of policy, to what 
cost, and timeframe of policy complex.   
                                                
7 These initial groups were the WMO, International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), UNEP, and the 
Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gasses (AGGG). 
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The 2007 report estimates that, if 2000 emissions were held constant, the best estimate 
for temperature rise by the year 2090-2099 would be between 0.3-0.9 C. Given six models of 
change in GHG emissions, however, the range of potential temperature changes (relative to 
temperatures from 1980 -1999) would be from 1.1 C (best estimate at low scenario end) to 6.4 
C (at the high scenario end) (Meehl et al., 2007, p. 5). The IPCC indicates that a 50-85 
percent decrease in emissions (base year of 2000) is needed to prevent concentrations of GHG 
in the atmosphere from increasing above 450ppm and temperature increase of 2 degrees by 
2050 (IPCC, 2007b, p. 15; Young, 2010). Whether the climate regime has included these 
recommendations and empirical evidence on the current emissions behavior and 
environmental quality will be presented in the following sections. 
3.2.3.  Institutional Background: Formation and Structure of the Regime 
The UN Conference on Human Development in Stockholm in 1972 is generally 
regarded as the first introduction of international efforts towards understanding how humans 
affect the global climate (Skodvin, 2000a). It was not until 1979 at the World Climate 
Conference when the World Climate Program was first organized. From 1979 until the late 
1980s (see Annex I for a detailed chronology), a movement gathered as international 
organizations became increasingly interested in negotiating a solution.  
The IPCC was the first intergovernmental institution to be established in 1988 in order 
to fill the gap for an internationally coordinated scientific assessment of climate change. The 
first session began in November 1988 with the goals of synthesizing and i) assessing the 
scientific information related to the issue and the information needed to evaluate the 
environmental and socioeconomic consequences, and ii) to formulate response measures for 
how to manage the issue (UNFCCC, 2004, p. 12; UNGA, 1988). 
The IPCC produces the most comprehensive scientific reports of synthesized peer 
reviewed research on the climate change issue. The Assessment Reports have been produced 
in 1990, 1995, 2001, and 2007. Research on the fifth assessment report is currently underway. 
The origin of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol both correspond with the timing of the 
release of assessments (IPCC, 2011). In 1990, when the first assessment was submitted, 
governments realized that the problem was serious. The assessment reported that if nothing 
was done, global mean temperature would increase by 0.3 degrees Celsius per decade, 
causing melting in the polar ice caps and a rise in sea level, which was predicted to be up to 
65 centimeters by the end of the 21st century (IPCC, 1990). The report emphasized that 
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preventing the problem would require stabilizing the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere 
to 1990 levels, translating to a 60percent reduction in emissions (IPCC, 1990).   
Discussions aimed at designing a convention began in December 19908 and formal 
negotiations for a climate convention were underway in February 1991 (Chasek et al., 2010, 
p.184). The leading coalition of states9 ideally wanted to ideally organize a framework 
convention and a protocol to control emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. The United States and 
the Soviet Union, however, rejected the idea of setting a target and timetable for controlling 
emissions in a future climate regime. One year after discussions had begun there was no 
resolution on the issue. Entering into 1992, US participation at the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro was contingent 
upon the UNFCCC draft text containing no binding commitment to control GHG levels 
(Chasek et al., 2010, p.185). Participation of the United States was preferable, and thus the 
text did contain a binding commitment.  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was finally adopted 
on May 9 1992, with the ‘framework’ text negotiated as best possible, and the leading 
countries left with hope of setting the stage for later more stringent actions (UNFCCC 2004). 
The convention was opened for signature at the Earth Summit in June 1992; 154 states and 
the European Community signed the convention. The convention entered into force when it 
received fifty ratifications on 21 March 1994 (UNFCCC, 2004). Today, there are 190 
countries that are Party to the Convention (UNFCCC, 2004).  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
The convention regulates greenhouse gasses that are not regulated by the Montreal 
Protocol (see Part I of this chapter). The primary gasses of concern are carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), peroflourinated hydrocarbons (PFCs), 
hydroflourocarbons (HFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The convention divides 
countries into three groups according to their differing commitments. Annex I parties (41 
countries) include the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD in 1992 and 
                                                
8 Initial coalition of states: Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden v. United States. The leading states wanted to 
organize a framework convention and a protocol controlling emissions, to be completed no later than one year 
after. The US only wanted talks on a framework convention with no negotiation on protocols, arguing that 
regulating carbon releases would require too massive of changes. Finally, Japan broke ranks with US and Soviet 
Union and committed itself to stabilizing GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. Only US and Soviet Union 
remained in rejecting a target and timetable for controlling emissions in a future climate regime (Chasek et al., 
2010, p.185). 
9 The EC, Australia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and New Zealand 
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countries with economies in transition (EIT) (14 countries), such as the Russian Federation, 
the Baltic states, and several Central and Eastern European States (UNFCCC, 2011d). These 
parties aim to return their emissions by 2000 to earlier levels (1990 chosen by the EC) 
(UNFCCC, 2004). Specifics regarding timetables for targets, or emissions reduction targets 
after 2000 were not addressed. Countries are not legally committed to hold themselves to the 
targets. Parties are required to submit reports on the implementation of the convention, 
particularly policies and measures taken on the state level to reduce GHG emissions 
(UNFCCC, 2004). 
Annex II parties (24 developed countries) are a subset of Annex I. They are the OECD 
members from Annex I, but do not include the EIT Parties. Annex II parties are required to 
provide financial resources to enable developing countries to adapt and mitigate climate 
change effects. In addition, they should “take all practicable steps” to promote technology 
transfer to EIT and developing countries, funneled through the Convention’s mechanisms 
(UNFCCC, 2011d). 
Finally, Non-Annex I Parties are primarily developing countries. These are states with 
the Non-Annex I countries that are considered especially vulnerable to climate change, in 
particular low-lying coastal areas, those prone to desertification, or drought. Other countries 
in this group may rely on income from fossil fuel (production and commerce) and may be 
vulnerable to the economic effects of climate change. There are 49 parties classified as least 
developed countries (LDCs) by the United Nations. These parties are given special 
consideration by the convention due to their limited capacity in being able to respond to 
climate change’s adverse effects (UNFCCC, 2011d). They are required to follow general 
commitments to respond to climate change, but they have fewer specific obligations and can 
rely on external support in order to meet their goals. They are required to “provide a general 
description of steps taken or envisaged in order to implement the Convention and estimate 
emissions of GHG” (UNFCCC, 2004).  
The UNFCCC is the framework around which the regime’s structures are based. All 
Parties to the convention meet annually at the Conference of the Parties (COP). In addition, 
the Convention’s text established important norms and principles for the regime to follow. Of 
note was the “common but differentiated responsibilities” (Article 3, United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992). This principle backed the aforementioned 
country differentiations by recognizing differing levels of economic development, 
vulnerabilities, and assigning commitments based on this classification.  
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The Kyoto Protocol  
Movement towards a protocol started to be negotiated shortly after the EC community 
signed the Convention, despite remaining lack of interest by the US and Russia. At the first 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in March 1995, it was decided that 
quantitative limits on GHG emissions beyond 2000 would be negotiated by 1997 (Chasek et 
al., 2010, p.185-187). As negotiations continued through COP-2 and progressed until COP-3 
(1997), differences between the leading states and the veto states were large. A point of 
contention was that the U.S. delegation would not accept any emissions reduction unless 
developing countries also formally agreed to control their emissions, which was not 
acceptable for the developing countries (Ibid.).  
The Kyoto Protocol was regardless negotiated at the COP-3 in 1997. It requires 
industrialized-country parties to Annex B to reduce their collective emissions of six different 
GHG (listed in Annex A) by at least 5percent below their 1990 levels between 2008 and 
2012. Exceptions were made for some country targets, for example there are distinguishable 
differences between targets of the veto states and the EU. Australia, for example, lobbied for a 
decreased reduction target (8 percent) due to particularly large reliance on fossil fuel exports 
in the economy. The US accepted a target of 7 percent10 reduction from base year of 1995 (as 
opposed to 1990) (Kyoto Protocol, Annex B). The EU received an 8 percent reduction. An 
agreement (voluntary or binding) for developing countries (Non-Annex I) was not included in 
the Kyoto Protocol (The Kyoto Protocol, 1997 ). 
The Kyoto Protocol expects that countries meet their reduction targets primarily 
through national measures. To this aim, the Protocol includes “flexibility mechanisms” that 
are market based and which would assist in the process (UNFCCC, 2011c). The mechanisms 
(Emissions Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation 
(JI) have multiple goals: they should instigate sustainable development through technology 
transfer and investment, they should assist with reduction of carbon in atmosphere in a cost-
effective manner, and would encourage the private sector and developing countries to 
contribute to emission reduction efforts (UNFCCC, 2011c). 
The mechanism of emissions trading, as described in Article 17, created what is now 
known as the carbon market (UNFCCC, 2011c).  It functions such that Annex I parties with 
excess emissions credits can sell its credits to an Annex B Party that is unable to meet its 
commitments. Carbon Development Mechanism, as described in Article 12, is a procedure 
                                                
10 Note that the US is a signatory to the Protocol but has not ratified. 
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through which developed countries can finance or invest in projects that avoid or help reduce 
GHG emissions in developing countries. In return the investing country receives credits that 
can be applied towards meeting limits on their own emission (UNFCCC, 2011a). Joint 
implementation (JI) as described in Article 6, is similar to the CDM, only in that it is between 
industrialized countries and economies in transition (the former Soviet bloc). Joint 
implementation projects must result in emission reduction or removals that are greater than 
what would have otherwise occurred.  
The Kyoto Protocol could enter into force after at 55 parties to the convention 
accounting for at least 55 percent of the CO2 emissions in 1990 ratified it. Most developing 
and small island state nations ratified immediately, but Annex I countries used subsequent 
COP meetings to address remaining issues – such as exact operationalization of the flexibility 
mechanisms until COP-7 in 2001 (Morocco) (Chasek et al, 2010). At that time, it was 
questioned whether the Protocol would be ratified. The United States announced familiar 
opposition to the Protocol on grounds that it did not include large economies like China and 
India as members of the non-Annex I group. The Protocol could be ratified without the US, 
but the US decision had ability to alter the decisions of other economically powerful 
countries. 
By 2004, 120 countries had ratified the protocol and 44 percent of 1990 emissions 
were represented. The focus was on recruiting Russia to ratify, as it represented 17.4 percent 
of 1990 emissions thereby allowing for the needed 55 percent of emissions. Incentives for 
Russia were numbered as it was assumed that they would benefit from the flexibility 
mechanisms. On November 18, 2004 they ratified, and the Kyoto Protocol officially entered 
into force on February 16, 2005 (Henry & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 47). By 2009, there were 188 
countries and the European Community that had ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The US remains 
the only Annex I Party to the UNFCCC Convention that has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.  
The compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol is based on the general compliance 
mechanism of the Convention and the UNFCCC says it is one of the most rigorous found in 
international treaties (UNFCCC, 2004, p. 85). The Compliance Committee is “facilitative” 
rather than punitive, with two branches, one Facilitative Branch and one Enforcement Branch 
each having separate responsibilities. The Enforcement branch is responsible for non-
compliance by parties that i) do not on GHG inventories, ii) not meeting emissions targets, or 
iii) eligibility requirements under the mechanisms. In the case of non-compliance with targets, 
measures such as deduction of emissions at a rate of 1.3 times the amount of excess emissions 
from the Party’s emissions in the second commitment phase, suspension from eligibility to 
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participate in the emissions trading, or preparation of a compliance action plan (UNFCCC, 
2004, p.86). Currently, there are four countries that have been issued questions of 
implementation: Croatia, Bulgaria, Canada, and Greece which have been questioned for 
several different reasons – regarding emissions trading quotas, reporting, national system 
implementation. The stated repercussions are that the country will submit a plan to address 
the non-compliance in three months, and that it cannot participate in CDM or alternatively 
emissions trading (UNFCCC, 2011b). 
Decision making in the Kyoto Protocol is grounded in the consensual approach 
established from early on in the UNFCCC. The Convention stated that parties should make 
every effort to reach agreement on any proposed amendment or annex to the Convention by 
consensus. If all efforts were to be exhausted, then the amendment could be adopted at a 
three-quarters majority vote (Article 15 of UNFCCC and 20 of Kyoto Protocol). The 
consensus-based decision-making makes it difficult to come to agreement, but is at the same 
time important for UN platform. After a consensus has been arrived at, there are guidelines 
for amendments. Article 20 and 21 of the Kyoto Protocol states that amendments to the 
Protocol will enter into force for those regime members that provide a written consent This 
means that members can easily opt out of adjustments and targets (Young, 2010, p. 99). 
Post 2012-Framework 
As soon as the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, attention turned to negotiating the 
second commitment period after the first 2008-2012 period. Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol 
states that the parties will use the COP of the UNFCCC to negotiate and consider subsequent 
commitments, but no detail is provided about whether the post-2012 commitment would be 
negotiated as an extension of the Kyoto Protocol or as a new agreement under the larger 
UNFCCC framework (Article 3.9, The Kyoto Protocol). At the Montreal COP11 in 2005, it 
was determined that COPs would consist of two parallel tracks associated with the two related 
agreements - the Protocol and the Convention. Montreal was the 11th Conference of the 
Parties (COP11) to the UNFCCC, and also the 1st Meeting of the Parties (CMP1) to the 
Kyoto Protocol. It is considered vital for the continuation of the regime that the processes run 
parallel to each other in order for the non-parties of the Kyoto Protocol (developing countries 
and the United States) to maintain their participation in the regime.  
Given the complexity of negotiating the second commitment period, it was important 
to set a path for the process. Climate analysts believed it was important to avoid a post-2012 
gap between the Kyoto Protocol and any subsequent policy that could potentially cause 
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uncertainty for economic and political order and a further fragmented system (Chasek et al., 
2010, p. 194). It was decided that at COP13 (2007) in Bali, Indonesia, a plan for negotiating 
post-2012 would be set. Thus, the Bali Action Plan was to provide guidance for the next two 
years leading up to the COP15/CMP5 in Copenhagen, Denmark where it was hoped a post-
2012 framework would be adopted.  
The Bali Action Plan accounted for both of the parallel tracks – the UNFCCC track 
(Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action) and the Protocol track (Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Protocol). The Bali 
Action Plan agenda included discussing national and international action on mitigation for 
developed and developing countries, adaptation, technology transfer, financial support, and 
investment, in addition to options for emissions reduction targets for the Annex I parties and 
potential commitments for post-2012. At the 2008 COP14 in Poznan, Poland these agenda 
items set by the Bali Action Plan were not thoroughly negotiated11 (Chasek et al., 2010, p. 
198). Progressing towards the Copenhagen meeting questions remained unanswered about the 
post-2012 framework. Would the next agreement be a continuation of Kyoto Protocol or 
something new entirely? Would it be binding vs. voluntary commitments, short term v. long 
term, total emissions vs. sources of emissions, mechanisms to assist developing countries, 
focus on adaption vs. mitigation?  
The COP15 in Copenhagen was expected to be the meeting during which the post-
2012 framework would be negotiated. However, as COP14 had foreshadowed, concerns about 
global financial crisis and recession on the horizon weakened hopes for political dedication to 
the matter. In addition, the United States, considered a necessary player for successful 
negotiations, was unable to domestically address climate change while national politics were 
focused on other politically heated topics (Bang, Froyn, & Hovi, 2009).  
The result of the COP15 was the Copenhagen Accord. The Accord was the product of 
a small group of heads of state - the United States, China, India, and Brazil. It was not 
formally adopted at the COP and has no formal standing in the U.N. negotiations. 130 
countries have associated themselves with the Accord and 80 have submitted specific 
mitigation pledges, as is suggested to be done voluntarily by the Accord (Pew, 2010). The 
Copenhagen Accord included a constructive start for negotiating a financing mechanism, and 
                                                
11 The COP14 outcome was likely influenced by the global financial crisis that reduced focus on climate change 
and increased worries that economic issues would overshadow emission reductions. In addition, the presidential 
election in the US created political uncertainty regarding the American position in 2009. The validity of these 
explanations, however, are not further addressed in this thesis. 
  45 
provided progress on discussions regarding forestry and technology transfer and theoretically 
signified cooperation between the world’s largest polluters. However, the political aftermath 
of the COP/CMP was skepticism of the international regime’s ability to negotiate a solution 
for climate change (Dimitrov, 2010). 
The following COP16/CMP6 in Cancun, Mexico resulted in the “Cancun 
Agreements.” The Agreements did not resolve the remaining issue of how to continue with 
the Kyoto Protocol or a binding agreement post 2012, as the divide between developing and 
developed countries remained insurmountable. Specific mitigation pledges were not changed 
or particularly addressed in the Cancun Agreements, but were referenced in both the 
convention decisions and the Kyoto decisions. In the Convention-track decision developing 
countries agreed to take nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) while being 
supported by technology and finance with the goal of some reduction by 2020. Developed 
countries are encouraged to increase their level of ambition to consistent with the “level 
consistent with the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change” (UNFCCC, 2011 -b). 
Cancun Agreements further defined mechanisms introduced in the Copenhagen 
Accord: the Green Climate Fund, mechanisms on adaptation, technology, forestry, and 
monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) (Pew, 2010). For finance, the convention track 
decision uses the financial goals of the Copenhagen Accord which was $30 billion in fast-start 
finance for developing countries in 2010-12, and by 2020 $100 billion a year in public and 
private finance for mitigation actions and transparency on implementation.  In Cancun, parties 
decided to establish a Green Climate Fund under the guidance of the COP, which will be 
governed by 24 members from developed and developing countries (Pew, 2010). This is a 
new development, because until this point, the regime has relied on the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF) to provide the funding needed by non-Annex I countries in order to implement 
development strategies that are less energy intensive (Young, 2010, p.96). The GEF operates 
outside the realm of climate change and is susceptible to the influence of other institutions 
like the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP (Young, 2010, p. 97). The regime relies on Article 11 
of the UNFCCC, which refers to the establishment of a “mechanism for the provision of 
financial resources on a grant or concessional basis” and requires that it include equitable 
representation of all Parties in transparent system (Article 11, UNFCCC 1992). In the Article 
countries are obligated to provide “new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed 
full costs incurred by developing country Parties” (Article 11, Kyoto Protocol 1997). 
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Closely related to the financing mechanism, another area of progress from recent 
negotiations has been in the area of technology transfer. Technology transfer under the 
Convention requires that developed country Parties and other developed Parties in Annex II 
shall take all steps possible to promote, facilitate, and finance as appropriate the transfer of, or 
access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, especially 
developing countries (Article 4.5, UNFCCC 1992). At COP16 a Technology Mechanism was 
designed, which consists of a Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and a Climate 
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) in replacement of the Expert Group on Technology 
Transfer (EGTT) (UNFCCC, 2011f).  
Both the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Convention-track decision set a goal of 
limiting average global warming to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and asked for 
periodic review of this long-term goal, with an option for strengthening the goal to 1.5 
degrees. A timeframe does not currently exist, but it is recommended that at COP17, parties 
suggest a timeframe for the peak of global emissions and an emissions goal for 2050 (Pew, 
2010).  
The agenda for the remaining part of 2011 leading to COP17 is large and includes 
addressing the legal form of a future climate agreement and a review of country mitigation 
commitments (UNFCCC, 2011e). As this thesis goes to print, the most recent round of 
negotiations in Bangkok, Thailand in early April was the first meeting after Cancun where 
negotiators addressed the Cancun Agreements in preparation for the COP17 in Durban, South 
Africa where the post-2012 framework will again be addressed. Developing countries made it 
again clear in Bangkok that they want a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol and it is unclear 
how flexible developed countries will be (UNFCCC, 2011e). In Table 5 below, the summary 
of the regime attributes and legal products to date is presented.
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Table 5: Summary of Regime Design and Attributes of the International Climate Change Regime   
 
Form of output   
 
UNFCCC (1992 [1994]) 
 
Kyoto Protocol (1997 [2005]) 
 
Amendments – current 
outcomes 
Number of ratified 
countries  
 
195  193 Parties, 
37 to Annex B, 
63.7% of Annex I countries 
are parties  
Copenhagen Accord (not 
adopted or ratified)  
 
Share of emissions 
covered 
 
N/A  55% of total Annex I CO2 
emissions for 1990 
N/A 
Mitigation 
commitments  
“Stabilization of GHG 
concentrations…that would 
prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system..” 
(Article 2, UNFCCC) 
 
Parties to Protocol amount to 
55% of global emissions 
 
Annex I Parties follow 
reductions in Annex A gasses 
(GHG) to the given amount in 
Annex B (‐8% to +10%), with 
view to reduce overall 
emissions by at least 5% 
below 1990 levels from 
period 2008‐2012.  
 
Cancun – recognizes Annex 
I countries should need 25‐
40% below 1990 levels by 
2020 
 
16 Annex I countries have 
provided emission 
reduction targets for 2020 
Legal status  
 
Not legally binding  Legally binding during 
commitment period of 2008‐
2012 
Not legally binding – part of 
negotiations for post 2012 
 
Long term goals, 
Ambition for 
timetables 
(None)   
Mitigation targets are for 
2008 – 2012 
 
Suggested a 2° maximum 
temp rise, above pre‐
industrial base, with an 
option for review and alter 
to 1.5° (date not stated) 
 
National targets for 2020 
voluntarily suggested 
Mechanisms for 
Technology transfer 
TT:Clear  (website) 
 
Technology Framework, 
designed/imple. 2001 
 
Expert Group on 
Technology 
Transfer (EGTT) 
CDM, JI, improve technology 
transfer 
 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA) 
 
 
Technology Executive 
Committee (TEC)   
 
Climate Technology Center 
and Network (CTCN) 
Mechanisms for 
Finance  
COP guidance to GEF which 
can provides support to 
projects 
The Adaptation Fund 
is financed from proceeds on 
CDM activities and other 
sources of funding. Amounts 
to 2% of certified emission 
reductions (CERs) issued for a 
CDM project. 
 
Green Climate Fund – $30 
billion 2010‐2012, $100 
billion by 2020  
 
Mechanisms for 
Compliance/Sanctio
ning  
 
(Minimal) 
Reporting of GHG 
inventories. Subsidiary 
Body of Implementation 
reviews effectiveness.  
Compliance Committee 
reviews national reporting 
and system for GHG 
inventories. The Enforcement 
Branch determines 
compliance. Punitive 
measures: emissions 
reductions in 2nd commitment 
period, suspension from ETS, 
compliance plan.  
Reporting system by Annex 
I and non‐Annex I countries 
of mitigation efforts, and 
(for Annex I) data on 
finance, technology, and 
capacity support. No 
punitive measures in 
response. 
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3.2.4.  Emission trends subsequent to the formation of the climate 
change regime 
In the following section, greenhouse gas emission trends are reviewed, as this is the 
primary source of anthropogenic climate change. In this section, emissions trends are 
measured by emissions from anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gases only.  
Greenhouse gas emissions have been rising since pre-industrial times, particularly 
since the 1970s. The IPCC uses two databases to measure emission trends, and both of which 
show that since 1970, the global warming potential (GWP) weighted emissions of GHGs12 
have increased by 70percent (or 24percent since 1990) (Rogner et al., 2007, p. 102). Carbon 
dioxide is the largest source of anthropogenic emissions (77percent), having grown 80percent 
since 1970, and 28percent since 1990 (Ibid.). The largest source of GHG emission originates 
from the power generation and road transport sectors, which from 1970 to 2004 grew by over 
145 percent and 120 percent respectively, largely in the form of CO2 emissions. There has 
also been growth in GHG emissions in the industrial (65 percent), residential and commercial 
sector (26 percent), Land use Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) (40 percent), and the 
agriculture sector (27 percent) from 1970 to 2004 (Ibid.). The growing emission trends are 
summarized in Table 6, through growth from 1970, and growth subsequent to regime 
formation.  
 
Table 6: Emissions trends from 1970 and subsequent to regime formation  
Emissions growth in chosen GHG, from 1970 – 2004 and 1990 – 2004. (Data from IPCC 2007)  
  Growth in emissions 
1970 ‐ 2004 
Growth in emissions 1990 ‐ 
2004 
Global Warming Potential weighted GHG 
emissions  
~70%  24% 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) from the combustion of 
fossil fuels 
80%  28% 
Methane (CH4)  40%  11% 
N2O13  50%  11% 
 
Aggregated global emissions have therefore increased. Although this study bases its 
assessment on aggregate measurements, regional data is of relevance for the climate regime 
                                                
12 Not including ODS, which are controlled by the Montreal Protocol 
13 Increase use of fertilizer and aggregate growth of agriculture 
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because both the Convention and Protocol differentiate between countries in their targets. 
North America, Asia, and the Middle East have led the rise in emissions since 1972 (Rogner, 
et al., 2007). While Annex I (developed countries) hold a 20 percent share of world 
population, they account for 46.4 percent of global the GHG emissions. Non-Annex I 
countries (developing countries) host 80 percent of the world population and account for 53 
percent of GHG emissions (Ibid.). Twenty-five countries accounted for 85 percent of global 
emissions, and the same 25 countries account for 87 percent of global GDP (Baumert, 
Herzog, & Pershing, 2005, p. 11). An additional difference is that Annex I countries have a 
lower energy intensity per unit of economic production process than the non-Annex I 
countries (Rogner et al., 2007).  
Aggregate emissions have increased, but some countries are decreasing emissions. The 
37 countries and the European Community party to the Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol are 
projected to aggregately decrease emissions by a projected 11 percent by 2012, which is more 
than the required 5 percent for the commitment period 2008-2012 that is required by the 
Protocol (UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2011 -a). As 
already presented in 3.2.3, the Kyoto Protocol does not regulate global emissions, particularly 
the 35 percent of global annual CO2 emissions produced by the United States and China 
(Congressional Research Service, 2008).  
In the absence of regulation, the current estimations by the International Energy 
Authority and the US Energy Information Administration are that –- global growth will be 
more than 55 percent from 2006 levels of energy-related CO2 emissions, with a growth rate of 
1.7 percent (IEA) to 2 percent (US EIA) per year until 2030. These estimates are 40-110 
percent higher than in 2000; 25 to 75 percent of this would belong to non-Annex I countries 
(Rogner et al. 2007, p.109). GHG emissions are projected at a 25-90 percent increase from 
base year of 2000 (IPCC, 2007, p. 97). Scenarios that account for the climate policies 
currently under discussion show GHG emissions increasing for many decades. The IPCC 
reports that emissions at or above current rates would induce changes that would be likely 
larger than those already observed during the 20th century (Meehl et al., 2007, 10.3). 
3.2.5.  Environmental Impact Subsequent to the Formation of 
International Climate Change Regime 
In this section, the environmental impact subsequent to the formation of the climate 
change regime will be presented. In the climate regime the institution that analyzes and 
presents assessments on the scientific and anthropogenic effects and causes of climate change 
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is the IPCC. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007) or the most recent data available 
will be utilized in this study. For climate change, the appropriate measurements of 
environmental changes chosen are those evidenced in the concentration of GHG in the 
atmosphere, as well as biophysical changes on the earth. 
 Atmospheric CO2 concentrations have increased by almost 100ppm in comparison to 
preindustrial level of 280ppm reaching 379ppm in 2005 (IPCC, 2007a, p. 37). For April 2011, 
the data registered for atmospheric CO2 was at 393.18ppm (NOAA, 2011).The total CO2 
equivalent concentration of all long lived GHGs, is currently estimated to be at 455 ppm CO2-
eq, but with land use-change and other air pollutants included decreases that level to 
somewhere between 311 and 435 ppm CO2-eq (IPCC, 2007, p. 97). From 1995 to 2005 the 
annual CO2 concentration growth has been larger (1.9ppm) than it was since the beginning of 
continuous direct atmospheric measurements from 1960 to 2005 (average of 1.4ppm per year) 
(P. Forster et al., 2007). The 350ppm target would need to be attained within the next few 
decades in order to avoid the most adverse effects of climate change (Hansen et al, 2008). The 
earth has not been below 350ppm since 1988, which was prior to the formation of the regime 
(NOAA, 2011).  
The IPCC estimates that from 1901-2005 the increase in temperature per decade was 
0.069-0.017, while from 1979-2005 it was 0.188-0.069 (Trenberth et al., 2007 ). The linear 
warming trend14 from 1965 to 2005 is almost twice what it was from 1906 to 2005 
(Trenberth, et al., 2007 ). Arctic temperatures rose on average almost twice the global rate in 
the past 100 years. During the period 1995-2006, eleven of these ranked among the twelve 
warmest years in instrumental record of the global surface since 1850. Model experiments 
estimate that even if all radiative forcing agents were held constant at the year 2000 levels, 
warming would continue at rate of 0.1 C per decade (Trenberth et al., 2007 , 9.4). It is very 
likely that Northern Hemisphere temperatures during the second half of the 20th century were 
higher than any other 50-year period in the past 500 years, and likely that it was the highest in 
the past 1300 years (Jansen et al., 2007).  
As a result of climate change, sea level has risen at a rate of 1.8mm per year from 
1961 – 2003. From 1993-2003 the rate is faster, at 3.1mm per year. This is due to thermal 
expansion of the oceans (57 percent) and decreases in glaciers and ice caps (28 percent), with 
the remaining amount from melting of the polar ice caps (Lemke et al., 2007, pp. 6-8). Arctic 
sea ice has shrunk by 2.7 percent per decade with decreases in the summer at 7.4 percent. In 
                                                
14 Linear warming trend 1965-2005: 0.13[0.10 to 0.16] degrees C per decade 
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addition, mountain glaciers and snow declined in both hemispheres – the extent of seasonally 
frozen ground has decreased by about 7 percent in the Northern Hemisphere since 1900. 
Temperatures at the top of the permafrost layer have generally increased since the 1980s in 
the arctic by up to 3 degrees Celcius (Bindoff et al., 2007; P. Forster, et al., 2007; Lemke, et 
al., 2007). As measured by the indicators of environmental impact and change of climate 
change, concentrations of GHG are increasing, temperature rise has accelerated, and other 
changes such as sea level rise and decreasing ice extent have been observed. For other 
relevant changes that have occurred as a result of climate change, see Appendix III.  
3.2.6.  International Climate Change Regime: Summary of Empirical 
Findings  
This review of the climate change regime has provided this study with the data 
necessary to assess effectiveness. The nature of the problem has been presented as being 
highly complex, both because of its drivers, the climate system at large, and the multiple 
consequences related to human-induced climate change. Uncertainty remains, but the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other academic research since the 1980s has 
shown that the impacts of warming temperatures are already causing observable changes on 
Earth. Although assigning a threshold for Earth’s capacity to adapt to these changes is a more 
difficult task than modeling and observing the changes, science has shown that a CO2 level of 
540ppm is at the upper reaches of what is tolerable, and current research maintains that 
350ppm is what is necessary to maintain stability in the climate system.  
The formation and structure of the regime has its origins from 1972, but it was in 1992 
that the UNFCCC was adopted, and 1994 when it entered into force. Due to its lack of 
specific mitigation targets and lack of a legally binding mechanism, work towards a Protocol 
started shortly thereafter. After negotiating for years, and the addition of multiple flexibility 
mechanisms that made it ultimately easier for countries to comply with targets, the Kyoto 
Protocol was adopted in 1997, and entered into force in 2005. The Kyoto Protocol is a legally 
binding treaty, which requires countries to reduce their emissions based on 1990 GHG 
emission levels from the first commitment period of 2008-2012. Although the countries party 
to targets in the Annex B of the Protocol are estimated to have reduced emissions by 11 
percent in the 2008-2012 commitment period, global emissions have increased since pre-
industrial times, since the 1970s, since 1990, and since 2000. Concentration of CO2-
equivalent GHG in the atmosphere has also increased. In addition, changes have been 
observed due to climate changes. 
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4.  How Effective are the International Climate Change and 
Ozone Depletion Regimes in Terms of Output,  Outcome 
and Impact? Case-internal and Comparative 
Classificatory Analyses 
 
This chapter is the culmination of this thesis’s quest to explore regime effectiveness, 
classify two cases in terms of regime effectiveness, and then compare them in this regard. The 
goal of this chapter is to present a structured evaluation of effectiveness of the climate and 
ozone regime, with as much transparency as possible. In order to do this, the chapter will be 
split into three sections. The first is an intra-regime classification of effectiveness for each 
regime individually along the three indicators – output, outcome, and impact.  Assessment of 
the regime’s effectiveness is conducted via comparison with standards that include elements 
of the collective optimal solution for each indicator. In using these standards, the theoretical 
underpinnings and framework presented in Chapter 2 is necessary. In that chapter, indicators 
were selected and justified. Also, the decision made regarding the standard to which the 
indicators would be compared was described in detail (see 2.5). Assigning a level of 
effectiveness to a regime is related to the difficulties of assigning levels of tolerance to 
changes in the physical environment. Such an evaluation of what constitutes danger cannot 
only be delegated to science, but involves normative and thus political judgment. When 
Parties agree to reach an agreement, the agreement will reflect a synthesis of what impacts are 
deemed tolerable from the perspectives of the human and natural systems.  In this chapter, 
assessment of regime effectiveness is completed through a combination of scientific and 
political judgments reflected in each standard, resulting in a hopefully robust description of 
effectiveness.  
Following the classification, a summary for each regime’s effectiveness is presented 
with the scores assigned. This is a necessary precursor to the subsequent comparison of 
regimes in terms of effectiveness. The rating of effectiveness scores will be given in prose at 
the ordinal level in the form of “high,” “medium,” and “low,” a scale that has also been 
utilized by Wettestad (1999:12). Transparency is maintained throughout this section and the 
study by using selected indicators, thorough empirical mapping of the data the indicators 
consist of, and clear description of the standard against which the indicator is being evaluated 
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(see chapter two for details on the analytical framework). Finally, a comparative analysis and 
areas of interplay between the two regimes will conclude the chapter. 
4.1.  The Regime Effectiveness of the Ozone Layer Depletion 
Regime 
4.1.1.  Output Effectiveness  
To measure effectiveness along the output indicator, I return to the operationalization 
of output as the norms, principles, and rules of the regime. In this section, empirical data as 
mapped in chapter three is compared against the ideal of an effective regime in terms of 
output that was defined in chapter 2.3.1. This indicator is expressed as the Montreal Protocol, 
which is the universally ratified primary agreement of the regime. The output indicator is 
evaluated in terms of three sub-indicators: ambition of targets and legal status; differentiation; 
and other attributes of institutional design.  
Ambition of Targets and Legal Status  
 
           An important factor in determining output effectiveness is the measurement of 
ambition of targets. The measurement of ambition that best reflects the concept of collective 
optimum (see 2.5) explores how adaptive the regime is to science, the share of global 
emissions accounted for in the regime, the number of countries ratified, and the legal status of 
agreements.   
 When the Montreal Protocol was adopted, policymakers were not aware of either the 
full consequences of the problem, nor the optimal mitigation solution. When the first 
Scientific Assessment Panel presented the first comprehensive report on ozone depletion, 
however, the regime began a pattern of amending the Protocol through dynamically adapting 
to new scientific information. This included adding control measures for new chemicals or 
accelerating timetables for phase-outs of others. This tight match between scientific advice 
and target negotiation offers a picture of effectiveness.  
Output effectiveness for this regime would not, however, be complete without 
reference to two chemicals for which regulation was not at the optimal level of meeting 
scientific advice and ambition: HCFCs and Methyl Bromide (MeBr). Of particular note is the 
discussion of substitutes for CFCs – which involves HCFCs and HFCs. The innovation of 
substitutes can be interpreted as a consequence of the ambitious targets set for CFCs. The 
targets were successful in creating a stable market that stimulated a response from industry to 
create substitute chemicals. Substitutes have played a large role in countries ability to phase 
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out CFCs, evidenced by increasing emissions of HCFCs. When new scientific research 
showed that HCFCs, while having a smaller ODP than CFCs, had a high GWP and for this 
reason the phase-out for HCFC was accelerated in 2007. This created an additional round of 
industry reaction in the design of a new substitute - the HFC. The HFC has an even higher 
global warming potential than the HCFC, although its ODP is nearly zero. HFCs are currently 
not regulated under the Montreal Protocol, but are in the ‘basket’ of greenhouse gasses 
included in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol. Scientists project that although increased 
emissions of HFCs will not be destructive to the ozone layer, they will contribute to climate 
change.  
This is indicative of the ozone regime having targeted the ozone depleting substances, 
but not the purposes for which the substances are used. Thus, although overall ozone 
depletion is being mitigated via targets and timetables (as evidenced by lower emissions and 
production – see following section) an alternate environmental impact (climate change) is 
occurring as a consequence of the regime. To conclude, the example of substitutes in the 
Montreal Protocol is one that can be considered to have both facilitated and restricted 
effectiveness of the regime. On the one hand, targets have been complied to with the use of 
substitutes, on the other, the use of substitutes has not absolved ozone depletion, nor has it 
removed the source of the problem. In addition targets appear to have alternate effects on 
another atmospheric problem: climate change. Thus, the example of HCFCs and HFCs does 
not take away from the ambition of the targets, but provides a reason for concern for the 
future of this effectiveness. 
In addition to substitutes, another chemical has proven to be challenging for the 
Montreal Protocol to regulate. Since the 1990s, methyl bromide had been suggested for rapid 
phase-out because of its threat to human health as a toxic pesticide and its ozone depletion 
potential (Chasek et al. 2010:169). The US and the EU had taken measures to control it 
domestically, but internationally the US managed to have a loophole approved that allowed 
for “critical use” (see chapter three). The treatment of MeBr therefore differs from the 
treatment of CFCs in the Protocol, both language in the clauses and target setting are less 
stringent (Gareau 2010: 210). In 1997 the phase-out for methyl bromide was finally 
negotiated, but with delay and lack of ambition that is noted as an anomaly in documentaries 
of the ozone regime history. However, in as much as it is an anomaly, it exemplifies that the 
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regime has faced conflict, and points to exogenous factors that may have played a role.15 In 
addition, delay in regulating MeBr may attest to the extreme importance of substitutes in the 
regulation of other ODS (Gareau, 2010). Of the industry and companies involved in 
producing ODSs, the methyl bromide industry is the only remaining camp that claims 
alternatives and substitutes do not exist to this chemical (Andersen et al., 2005). The 
argument by industry is that MeBr cannot be regulated because of this.  It was the first 
chemical to be commercialized in 1900 and the last to be added to the Protocol in 1992 
(Andersen et al., 2005). The example of MeBr casts a shadow on the effective score of output 
effectiveness through evidence of lacking ambition in grappling with this chemical. If MeBr 
was as prominent as CFCs, for example, the regime might not have managed to attain such a 
high level of effectiveness. 
Although there are exceptions to the level of ambition in target setting for all 
chemicals in the Montreal Protocol, the regime has shown a pattern of developing control 
measures based on scientific knowledge and advice and subsequent ambitious target and goal 
setting. Based on the level of ambition, the regime is at the outset highly effective. In the 
remaining review of output effectiveness for the ozone regime, other institutional attributes 
will be reviewed in order to complete a score for effectiveness. 
Differentiation  
The Montreal Protocol’s now universal ratification means that it accounts for all 
emissions in its control measures. However, Article 5 allows for differentiation between the 
countries’ timetables for control measures. In the ozone regime ‘differentiation’ means 
countries are subject to regulation, but they are offered a grace period of ten years for 
fulfilling commitments. This attribute of the legal framework of the regime has contributed to 
stark regional differences in behavioral trends, where developed countries have decreased 
emissions and developing countries have increased (see section below on outcome). Although 
the countries are differentiated, all countries are accounted for in the Protocol. The 
explanation for this will not be explored here, but are founded in the following section on 
institutional design. The important point is that, on the sub-indicator of differentiation, the 
ozone regime is highly effective as it enabled differentiation between countries (ensuring 
fairness), but still managed to incorporate developing countries into the regulatory scheme 
(Barrett, 2003, pp. 346-351).  
                                                
15 Exogenous factors (such as heavy lobby interest of the agricultural industry and countries which are represent 
these interests) that can explain the lack of ambition are not of discussed in this study. 
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Other Attributes of Institutional Design  
There are several institutional mechanisms that reflect output effectiveness of the 
regime. The presence of a funding mechanism, The Multilateral Fund, assured countries that 
they could afford the implementation of the Protocol’s regulations. Secondly, the restrictions 
on trade with non-parties preventing non-party countries to gain a competitive advantage over 
those party to the Protocol. Finally, the presence of a compliance mechanism dictated by 
Article 7 which requires that parties submit reports regarding emissions trends. The presence 
of these mechanisms result in an effective regime, as measured on the output indicator.  
The formal Non-Compliance measure was adopted in order to handle cases whereby 
reporting did not occur, or when the standard wasn’t met. Reporting problems have occurred 
(see 3.1.3.) The Multilateral Fund, one of the methods through which non-compliance is 
reconciled, is meant to act as assistance for implementation. In the 1990s it did not function as 
it was originally intended, but in more recent years has functioned well and is considered a 
positive attribute of the regime (Oberthür, 2001). The effectiveness of the compliance 
mechanism of the Montreal Protocol has been high.  
In conclusion, output effectiveness for the ozone regime has been high. The Montreal 
Protocol, following the initially low ambition of the Vienna Convention, provided a legally 
binding ambitious Protocol, in the face of scientific uncertainty. When science provided 
insight into the repercussions of ozone depletion and what was needed to prevent them, 
negotiators strengthened amendments and targets were tightened.  
4.1.2.  Outcome Effectiveness 
To attain goals set by the ozone layer depletion regime means to meet the targets and 
timetables of the Montreal Protocol. This includes the control measures (emissions and 
production regulation), control of trade with non-Parties, and reporting under Articles 7 and 9. 
Compliance has generally been good (Wettestad, 1999, p. 131). Instances of non-compliance 
to the Montreal Protocol have occurred in the reporting data, but since 2001 compliance has 
been observed (Andersen et al., 2005).  
Emissions and production of ozone depleting substances have decreased by 85 percent 
(as of 2001) since the Montreal Protocol was adopted in 1987 (see 3.1.2). Current assessments 
by the SAP estimate that emissions would have continued to rise at 6 percent a year without 
the Montreal Protocol (WMO, 2010).  
Due to the decreases in CFC consumption and production, emissions trends of the past 
decade highlight a sharp increase in the emissions of HCFC, the substitute for CFC (see 
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output effectiveness). In 2010, HCFC emissions were larger than what was projected in 2006, 
and it is estimated that emissions of HFC (the substitute for HCFCs) will follow a similar 
upwards trend as HCFCs. This is connected to economic growth and subsequent increased 
emissions in the Article 5 countries, where the grace period for phase-outs allows for larger 
emissions for a longer period of time (see 3.1.3). This trend is reason for caution in the 
assessment of effectiveness on this sub-indicator. However, as this thesis assesses the regime 
only at the current point in time, concerns about future trends do not contribute to the score. 
As measured against the standard of the regime’s political agreements (goal 
attainment), the ozone regime’s effectiveness according to the outcome indicator is highly 
effective. As stated in the Scientific Assessment Panel:  
“The success of the Montreal Protocol and its subsequent Amendments and Adjustments is 
evident from the large decreases in the production of ODSs since their peak at the end of the 
1980s, from the large decreases in emissions, and from decreases in mid-latitude EESC 
(equivalent effective stratospheric chlorine) since the middle of the 1990s that are expected to 
continue throughout the 21st century” (WMO, 2010, p. 5:33). 
4.1.3.  Impact Effectiveness  
There are several ways to operationalize the impact indicator for ozone layer 
depletion, one of which is mentioned in the above quote. The method determined for this 
study was the one most compatible for both regimes as a common metric. This is the 
concentration in the atmosphere of, for the ozone regime, chlorine and bromine in the 
troposphere and stratosphere 16 or for the climate regime, CO2-equivalents. This measurement 
has a closer association to emissions trends, and is thereby closer to measuring the causal 
mechanism between the regime and environmental improvement. An alternate method for 
measuring impact of the ozone regime is by measuring the amount of ozone (or amount of 
ozone depletion) present in the atmosphere. The ozone layer regime will be assessed on both 
of these measurements in this section.  
Scientists measure “improvement” by using a baseline of 1980. The year 1980 is used 
as representative of the time before major stratospheric ozone losses occurred due to 
halocarbons (WMO, 2010, p. 10). In the 2010 Assessment, it was projected that returning to 
1980 levels of equivalent effective stratospheric chlorine would occur in the year 2014-15, 
                                                
16 Chlorine and bromine are the byproducts of ozone depletion in the atmosphere by ozone depleting substances. 
Refer to chapter three for more info.  
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which is one year less than projected during the previous Scientific Assessment17. Despite the 
progress evidenced by declining chlorine and bromine in the atmosphere, the 2010 
Assessment reported that decreases in tropospheric chlorine were slower during 2005-2008 
than in earlier years and compared to what was projected during the baseline scenario of the 
2006 Assessment. In addition, the SAP 2010 contends that the there was an underestimation 
of CFC emissions from banks in 2006 (see 3.1.5). Regardless of minor setbacks, combined 
with the data of chlorine and bromine concentrations are evidence of an improving 
environmental quality towards the scientific goal of pre-1980 levels and a therefore medium 
effective regime.  
The second measurement of the impact indicator for the ozone regime is 
operationalized by the amount of ozone. The global level of ozone, while being 2.5-3.5 
percent less than pre-1980 levels, has remained relatively constant since 1999 (minimum was 
approximately 1994) (WMO, 2010). This may be due to the long lifetime of the chemicals 
regulated in the regime (CFCs range from 45-100 years) which means that despite decreases 
in recent emissions, the effect will not be noticed in the ozone layer for decades (Parson, 
2003; Andersen, 2005).  
In conclusion, the impact indicator - as assessed against scientific recommendations as 
the collectively optimal solution for the planet – provides evidence of a slight decrease in 
atmospheric concentration of chlorine and bromine towards the goal of returning to pre-
intensive ODS emissions era. This operationalization of impact shows a more optimistic view 
of the regime’s impact than measuring levels of ozone. Actual levels of ozone remain 
depleted, as well as the holes above the Antarctic and Arctic, but have not regressed since the 
mid 1990s, which the scientific panel assessment attributes to a well functioning regime. 
Given these data at this moment in time the regime is determined to be effective in improving 
the environmental quality, but has not yet attained the ideal scientific goal in either instance of 
indicator operationalization.  
4.1.4.  International Ozone Depletion Regime – Overall Effectiveness 
Summary  
At this moment in time, the international ozone depletion regime scores as a highly 
effective international environmental regime, as measured along the three indicators of 
                                                
17 The assessment importantly notes that this is an estimation. If the estimation were only reliant on 
anthropogenic sources of chlorine than it might be more accurate.  
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output, outcome, and impact. This analysis has also presented evidence showing that although 
the regime is highly effective, there are signs of imperfection that serve as reservations for the  
The ozone regime provides ample evidence of effectiveness in the output indicator 
along the parameters of ambition; and medium effectiveness along parameters of 
differentiation and other attributes of institutional design. The ambition and 
comprehensiveness of the Montreal Protocol attest to the regime’s willingness to follow the 
advice of the research community on the matter. Recently, the regime has also included 
scientific research on the global warming potential of some ODS and ambition in this regard 
as well. The two instances of HCFCs and Methyl Bromide exemplify situations in which the 
Protocol’s institutional capacity was not as flexible and responsive in adopting more stringent 
regulations. However, despite delay, the Protocol managed to account for these chemicals in 
recent amendments.  
The Montreal Protocol has presence of institutional design attributes that reflect an 
effective regime. These include financial mechanisms, compliance measures, and technology 
transfer. These attributes are particularly relevant for Article 5 members of the regime, which 
rely on such mechanisms for complying with the regime’s demands. Article 5 of the Protocol 
is both reason for effectiveness and ineffectiveness. While developing countries present a 
challenge because of increasing emissions behavior, they are regardless legally bound within 
the Protocol such phase-outs will occur, after the grace period.  
The ozone regime has attained its goals of regulating ozone-depleting substances and 
is therefore highly effective on the outcome indicator. While ODS emissions trends have 
decreased and provide evidence of an effective regime, a worrisome trend is increases in the 
substitutes for ODS which are also GHG. These trends show that although ODS may be 
phased out, the purposes for which they are needed have not been. As developing countries 
continue to experience economic growth, the increases in substitute emissions may become 
more relevant to the regime. However, for the time being the outcome indicator shows 
evidence of a highly effective regime.  
Measuring the impact indicator shows improvement in environmental quality and 
offers evidence of an effective regime. As mentioned above, impact is not yet the most 
complete indicator of effectiveness, as the effect of current policies on the natural 
environment will not occur for years. This is true when examining actual ozone levels as an 
indicator, which does not show any substantial change, but for which there has not been 
regression in conditions either. The ozone layer will likely not be able to recover for at least 
another 6 years, if not longer. Thus, on the measurement of this indicator, the ozone regime is 
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effective: signs exist that improvement (or at least stabilization) has occurred, but it is yet too 
early to see whether the regime will be able to optimally solve the problem at hand. In the 
Based on the discussions in this section, in Table 7 the regime effectiveness results are 
presented for each indicator. 
 
 
 
Table 7: International Ozone Regime Effectiveness Scores for the Output, Outcome, 
and Impact Indicators* 
 
 
Output Indicators for Regime Effectiveness   
 
Output 
Effectiveness Score  
 
Overall 
Score  
Ambition of targets  
• Share of world emissions accounted for in the agreement 
• How targets compare with scientific recommendations  
 
 
High (w/ 
differentiation) 
High  
 
 
 
 
 
 
High  
Legal Status  
• Whether commitment declarations of intent are legally binding in 
international law? 
• Number of ratified countries 
 
High  
 
High  
Differentiation (different targets and timetables that account for the various 
types of actors, taking into account variation in parties particular conditions) 
 
High  
Other aspects of Institutional Design 
o Funding mechanism  
o Monitoring, reporting and verification mechanisms/review of national 
policies 
o Sanctioning mechanisms to apply in case of implementation failure  
o Scientific body with systematic dissemination of data and reporting 
 
High 
Medium 
 
Medium/Low 
High 
 
Outcome Indicator  
 
 
Outcome 
Effectiveness Score 
 
Overall 
Score 
o Have emissions of ozone depleting substances decreased or been 
phased out in accordance to the goals set by the most recent 
amendments ratified? 
o Has aggregate global emissions decreased subsequent to the 
formation of the regime?  
High 
 
 
High  
 
High 
 
Impact  
 
Impact 
Effectiveness Score 
 
Overall 
Score 
o Concentration of chlorine and bromine in atmosphere  
o Level of ozone in atmosphere  
High (slight 
decrease) 
Neutral 
(stabilization) 
 
 
Medium‐
High 
*  For operationalization of the indicators and scoring scales, see chapter two. For empirical findings see 
chapter three. 
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4.2.    The Effectiveness of the International Climate Change 
Regime 
4.2.1.    Output Effectiveness  
To measure effectiveness along the output indicator, I return to the operationalization 
of output as the norms, principles, and rules presented in chapter two. In this section, 
empirical data as mapped in chapter three is compared against the ideal of an effective regime 
in terms of output that was defined in chapter two. To evaluate regime effectiveness for the 
indicator of output one must examine the two main texts of the regime, the UNFCCC (1992) 
and the Kyoto Protocol (1997). This is because the Kyoto Protocol does not encompass all 
members of the convention. There are 195 countries party to the UNFCCC. There are 193 
parties to the Kyoto Protocol, but only 37 countries plus the European Community are parties 
to Annex B. The regime operates on the philosophy that if non-Protocol ratified members can 
participate on some level that in the future a legally binding agreement could be made 
universal. The output indicator is evaluated in terms of three sub-indicators: ambition of 
targets and legal status; differentiation; and other attributes of institutional design. 
 
Ambition of Targets  
The adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in 1992 was a loose framework that did not include legally binding mitigation 
targets. The Article 2 text describes the objectives of the UNFCCC: 
“The ultimate objective of this Convention …is to achieve… stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.  Such a level should be achieved within a time frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner.” 
The UNFCCC is not legally binding and is therefore not an ambitious product of the regime. 
In addition, the vague and unambitious mitigation target of stabilization is not specific and 
does not imply decreases in emissions. The UNFCCC while attesting to some level of 
political cooperation, results in a low score of effectiveness for this indicator.  
The adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 showed improvement in level of ambition. 
The Protocol set legally binding mitigation targets for each country that was party to the 
Protocol, with the collective target of 5 percent decrease in emissions from 1990. The first 
commitment period was limited to 2008-2012. While the Protocol defines targets, the share of 
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emissions regulated is small. In addition, lack of a long-term timetable lessens its 
ambitiousness.  
How do the mitigation targets of the Kyoto Protocol compare with what is 
scientifically recommended?  Current research and estimations for what is needed in terms of 
emissions reduction is dependent on what “climate goal” (i.e. the desired level of climate 
change) is used in the modeling. In section 3.2.2 it was reviewed the various thresholds the 
Earth is estimated to be able sustain of climate change.18  An ambitious target could utilize the 
data presented by setting targets of maximum temperature change, parts per million carbon 
dioxide, or emissions reductions. Neither the Kyoto Protocol nor the Convention meets any of 
the suggested operationalizations of an ambitious target. Therefore, in its current form, the 
climate regime measures at a low level of effectiveness based on its level of ambition.  
 
Differentiation  
The lack of global participation in the Kyoto Protocol is a significant weakness of the 
Protocol. This is also a reflection on the UNFCCC, where the Annex I and Non-Annex I 
grouping has its origins (See 3.2.3). Non-Annex I countries are not legally bound under the 
Kyoto Protocol to any emissions reductions. This differentiation between countries is 
grounded in one of the central principles of the climate regime: the idea of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” articulated in Article 3 of the UNFCCC. Because emissions of 
GHGs are not uniform across all regions and countries, this is a crucial aspect for assessing 
the ambitiousness of the climate regime. A very small number of countries produce the 
majority of global GHG emissions (see 3.2.4). This means that any agreement must somehow 
accommodate for variation in share of responsibility of the problem. Taking this into account 
in the targets, however, has had repercussions on the ambitiousness of the Protocol in that 
only Annex I countries are party to Annex B. Although the Kyoto Protocol could not enter 
into force without 55 percent of the Annex I emissions ratified and represented, the emissions 
limited by Kyoto represent only 32 percent of global emissions (Pew, 2005). Thus, 
differentiation in the climate change regime results in a score of low-effectiveness in this sub-
indicator.  
                                                
18 See 3.2.2 for more information. Examples include: Emissions frozen at base-year of 2000 for 0.3-0.9 degree 
Celsius increase (IPCC); 60-80 percent decrease in emissions in order to prevent 450ppm.  
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Other Attributes of Institutional Design  
The Kyoto Protocol included several mechanisms designed to enhance participation 
and cooperation globally (particularly for developing countries), encourage compliance, and 
assist in mitigating the problem. In practice, the presence of many of the mechanisms is 
indicative of effectiveness, but in practice many have not been as useful. This thesis does not 
go into depth on the success of the mechanisms and their consequences, however, has briefly 
presented the attributes of the institution and to what extent they represent regime 
effectiveness. 
The flexibility mechanisms (the ETS, CDM, and JI – see 3.2.3) do not add to a greater 
level of success in the regime. They were introduced as ways to enhance abatement efforts, 
increase participation, technology transfer (UNFCCC, 2011c), and to decrease marginal costs 
differences of climate change abatement projects in Annex I and non-Annex I countries 
(Barrett 2003: 381). The flexibility mechanisms have generated confusion and have not 
always been utilized in the ways they were created. Because of this, it is argued that although 
they hold potential to do so, they reflect low- effectiveness.  
In regards to the finance mechanism and closely related technology transfer, an 
effective design has not yet been implemented. Recent negotiations at COP15 and COP16 
signal progress in this area. As technology transfer is largely based on the financing 
mechanism, the GEF has been the main actor involved in technology transfer projects 
mandated by the regime. The inadequacies of the funding mechanism affect technology 
transfer. Recent changes and report requests by the COP/CMP since COP13 reflect an interest 
by the regime to improve a less than effective system (UNFCCC United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 2008). From what is currently ratified, technology transfer 
and the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol does not present evidence 
of regime effectiveness.  
The compliance mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol is evidence of high regime 
effectiveness. According to the UNFCCC it is a rigorous system that is on par with the best of 
international treaties (UNFCCC, 2004, p.85). Currently, the compliance mechanism for the 
Kyoto Protocol manages non-compliance with the emissions targets has not been enforced 
yet, as the commitment period ends in 2012. The current cases of non-compliance are in 
regards to not implementing national systems (see 3.2.3). The compliance system is therefore 
well planned and well functioning, but the larger issue is that the Protocol’s lacking ambition 
makes compliance easier and non-compliance much less relevant.  
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The output indicator on the whole sends mixed signals as to how effective the regime 
is based on this measurement. The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated with several mechanisms 
that are considered innovative. However, without ambitious and encompassing targets, 
theoretically effective mechanisms cannot make up for the low effectiveness in other areas. 
The IPCC sums it up: “The numerous mitigation measures that have been undertaken by 
many Parties to the UNFCCC and the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005 
are inadequate for reversing overall GHG emission trends” (IPCC, 2007b, p. 97). 
4.2.2.    Outcome Effectiveness  
Measurement of the outcome indicator, as with the output indicator, must be measured against 
both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. As is discussed above, the Convention does not 
set specific mitigation targets and is not legally binding (section 4.2.1), thus whether one has 
attained the target is rather subjective. However, the one feature of Article 2 that can be used 
as the standard is the goal of “stabilization” of emissions. Thus, one can question: have trends 
stabilized? Current data show that from 1970 to 2004 there was a 70 percent increase in GWP 
weighted GHG emissions, and a 24 percent increase since 1990, with mean annual growth 
rates from 2000-2005 higher than those in the 1990s (see 3.2.4). The IPCC states: “from an 
emissions perspective, we are not on track for meeting the objectives of UNFCCC Article 2” 
(Rogner et al., 2007, p.111). Thus, the goal set by the UNFCCC has not been attained; the 
regime is assessed at low-effectiveness for this sub-indicator.  
The second goal of the regime is the Kyoto Protocol which sets clear mitigation targets 
and is legally binding and is therefore a standard by which we can compare current emissions 
trends (outcome) against. The Protocol required the parties to Annex B to regulate Annex A 
gasses to a level of 5 percent below a base-year of 1990. Current projection by the UNFCCC 
is that the overall reduction in this group of countries will be 11 percent (UNFCCC, 2011 -a). 
Thus, by the standard of the Kyoto Protocol as the goal, emissions trends are on track for 
meeting the targets operationalized and goal attainment. When operationalized in this manner, 
the regime is highly effective.  
Thus, there are two different versions of the output indicator when accounting for both 
the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC. While the effectiveness score for this indicator meets 
the requirements, it must be taken in combination with the output indicator score. There is a 
fundamental discrepancy rooted in the ambition of the Protocol’s targets and the goal 
attainment. This project does not seek to explain the assigned levels of effectiveness, 
however, for the sake of comprehensiveness, it is relevant to note that both endogenous 
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institutional factors (lack of ambition) and exogenous factors (EIT countries significant 
reductions in emissions accounts for aggregate reduction) explain the regime’s effectiveness 
as measured by meeting targets (Seter, 2011). A more demanding standard than goal 
attainment would allow for the conclusion that although the climate change regime has 
slowed growth in emissions in some countries, it has not kept them from increasing on a 
global scale. For this study, however, along the goal attainment standard, the regime presents 
a score of medium effectiveness.  
4.2.3.    Impact Effectiveness  
As with the ozone regime, using indicator of impact for climate change can be 
operationalized in multiple ways. As was determined in chapter two, concentration of CO2 
ppm in the atmosphere will be utilized here as the common metric which enables comparison 
across the regimes. Accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere is a one-step removed 
measurement of anthropogenic driver of climate change (emissions behavior), but is not an 
effect of climate change. To measure climate change directly, the operationalization includes 
temperature change, sea level rise, diminishing icecaps, and changes in climate systems, etc. 
can be used (see 3.2.4). The operationalization used in target setting for policy makers as 
“yardsticks” are temperature change and parts per million of CO2 concentrations in the 
atmosphere.  
As is clearly indicated in section 3.2.5, atmospheric concentrations of CO2-equivalent 
have increased since pre-industrial era, and have only accelerated since the formation of the 
regime. This increase in concentrations subsequent to the formation of the regime is evidence 
of a low level of effectiveness of the regime, or even a negative-effectiveness as the trend is in 
blatant opposition to any measurement of improvement on the issue.  
The use of temperature increase can also be a measurement of the impact indicator, 
but it is not as direct of a measurement of the regime’s impact as current concentrations of 
CO2. In 2007 the IPCC reports that the linear warming trend for the globe has been in the 
range of 0.069 ±0.017 from 1901-2005 while from 1979-2005 it was 0.188±0.069 (P. Forster, 
et al., 2007). This increasing trend, even subsequent to the formation of the regime, is in 
opposition to what is recommended by scientists in order to avoid detrimental impacts of 
climate change. This aggregate regression in biophysical conditions reflects a planet that is, 
thus far, unaffected by the presence of the international climate change regime, rendering the 
regime at a low level of effectiveness.  
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4.2.4.    International Climate Change Regime – Overall Effectiveness 
Summary  
The international climate change regime’s effectiveness as measured by the output, 
outcome, and impact indicators, shows an overall picture of an ineffective international 
environmental regime. Despite this discouraging overall score, the individual indicator scores 
provide more subtle information, some of which is optimistic. Following is a summary of 
regime effectiveness for the international climate change regime.  
 The climate regime provides evidence of low effectiveness when measured on the 
output indicator along the standard of what ideal regime attributes are present in institutional 
design. The indicator, while being overall negative, does present some mixed messages. 
Along the parameter of ambition the regime is definitively low in effectiveness. Along the 
parameter of differentiation the regime ranks both low and medium, as differentiating is 
important due to the pattern of emissions, but has contributed to the unambitious and 
ineffective small share of emissions accounted for. Other institutional attributes of the regime 
are ranked low with an inclination towards medium. There is evidence of improvement on 
several mechanisms, the presence of a compliance mechanism and the flexibility mechanisms 
show potential, however, the lack of ambitious targets and timetables restrict these 
mechanisms from functioning to this potential. Ultimately, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol fail to meet a level of ambition that matches what is necessary for mitigating climate 
change.  
 Along the indicator of outcome, the climate regime is expected to attain the aggregate 
target set by the Kyoto Protocol for the first commitment period, implying an effective 
regime. Regime effectiveness as measured on the outcome indicator gives a confused 
message that can only interpreted in the context of the output indicator as well. It is difficult 
to use the Convention as a standard because of the lack of specificity in the targets. However, 
when measuring trends against the objective of “stabilization” the conclusion is that this goal 
has not been attained and the regime ranks at low-effectiveness. 
 An assessment of the impact indicator shows an aggregate decline in global 
environmental quality resulting in a score of low effectiveness, if not negative. This indicator 
was measured at two levels: one indicator being closer to behavioral change (concentration) 
and the other as the effect of increased concentrations (temperature). Neither indicator shows 
sign of improvement, thus neither indicate effectiveness. While the impact indicator is not an 
adequate measurement yet of regime effectiveness as environmental changes have a long time 
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lag it is regardless an important indicator to measure. This will be discussed further in the 
conclusion. In Table 8, the scores from the above discussions are summarized.  
 
Table 8: International Climate Regime Effectiveness Scores for the Output, 
Outcome, and Impact Indicators* 
 
 
Output Indicators for Regime Effectiveness  
Output 
effectiveness 
Score 
 
Overall 
Score  
Ambitiousness  
• Share of world emissions accounted for in the agreement 
• How targets compare with scientific recommendations  
 
 
Low  
Low  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medium‐
Low 
Legal Status  
• Whether commitment declarations of intent are legally 
binding in international law? 
• Number of ratified countries 
 
Yes 
 
Medium 
Differentiation (different targets and timetables that account for the 
various types of actors, taking into account variation in parties 
particular conditions) 
 
 
Low/Medium  
Mechanisms  
o Funding mechanism  
o Monitoring, reporting and verification mechanisms/review of 
national policies 
o Compliance mechanism  
o Scientific body with systematic dissemination of data and 
reporting 
 
Low (current 
negotiating) 
Medium  
High 
High  
 
 
Outcome Indicators for Regime Effectiveness  
Outcome 
Effectiveness 
Score 
 
Overall 
Score  
o Have emissions of greenhouse gasses stabilized in accordance 
to the UNFCCC? 
o Have emissions decreased in accordance to the Kyoto 
Protocol? 
o Have aggregate global emissions decreased subsequent to the 
formation of the regime? 
Low  
 
High  
 
Low  
 
 
Low  
 
Impact Indicators for Regime Effectiveness  
Impact 
Effectiveness 
Score 
 
Overall 
Score  
o Concentration (ppm) of CO2‐equivalent GHG in the 
atmosphere? 
o Temperature rise  
  
Low (Negative) 
Low (Negative) 
 
Low 
*  For operationalization of the score see chapter two, for empirical findings see chapter three   
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4.3.    Comparison of regime effectiveness between the 
International Climate Change and Ozone Depletion Regimes  
 
In this last, crucial, main section of the empirical analysis chapter, I will compare the 
effectiveness of the two regimes along each indicator. The following table, along with the 
more detailed Table 7 and Table 8 in the above sections provide an overview of the main 
findings of the study until this point. In the following comparative analysis, the ozone regime 
and the climate regime will be compared along the parameters of output, outcome, and 
impact. 
 
Table 9: Classification of Regime Effectiveness 
 
Classification of Regime Effectiveness 
 
Indicator of 
Regime 
Effectiveness 
Operationalization of standard (see 
chapter 2 for details) 
Ozone Layer  
(Using most recent 
legally binding regime 
output) 
Climate Change  
(Using most recent 
legally binding regime 
output) 
 
Output  
Ideal output for an effective regime 
– literature based optimum  
 
High  
 
Low 
 
Outcome 
Goal attainment – how has 
behavior met standards set by the 
regime? 
 
High  
 
Medium  
 
Impact  
What environmental improvement 
has been observed? 
 
Medium  
 
Low ‐ negative 
 
4.3.1.    Comparing Effectiveness in Terms of Output 
On the output indictor, the ozone and climate regimes vary significantly. This is despite the 
fact that the Kyoto Protocol was designed based on the Montreal Protocol, a function of 
similarity on the issue areas and timing. The Montreal Protocol is the model in this 
relationship. As Oberthür (2001, p. 360) notes, there is very little of the Kyoto Protocol that 
cannot be attributed to the Montreal Protocol. In particular, the development of convention to 
protocol was one first and fundamental decision. A comparison between the regimes’ designs 
is presented in the following, in the understanding that although attempts were made to 
streamline these regimes by the original designers, in practice they have large differences. In 
doing this, the following regime attributes and norms will be compared: ambitiousness of 
targets, differentiation, flexibility and funding mechanism.  
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The most obvious variance when comparing the ozone and climate regime is on the 
parameter of ambition of targets. This is in regard to specificity of targets and share of 
emissions. In terms of the specificity of the targets, the Montreal Protocol has permanent 
emissions limits, while the Kyoto Protocol requires minimal reduction of emissions on a 
short-term time period. The Montreal Protocol has negotiated targets in response to scientific 
recommendations and newly developed research, while the climate regime has not shown 
capacity to respond with targets that resonate with what science recommends.  
The difference in ambition extends to another key area of variance in the level of 
differentiation. Both regimes take into consideration differences in levels of economic 
development and emissions burden shares between regions and countries. This is an important 
when solving a problem of the global commons and was established as a norm in the ozone 
regime. However, accepting differing targets between developing and developed countries has 
multiple consequences. On the one hand, matters of fairness and equity must be taken into 
consideration in order to enhance participation on the part of developing countries and 
enhance regime accountability. On the other hand, on the long-term perspective, 
comprehensiveness in terms of share of emissions can be lost.   
The ozone regime managed to allow for differences, while also regulating future 
emissions of the developing countries. The Montreal Protocol provides a grace period to 
developing countries, accounting for developing country emissions in control measures.  The 
Kyoto Protocol, however, does not include developing countries in any form of regulation. In 
this sense the ozone regime’s share of regulated emissions is universal, while the climate 
regime currently accounts for the emissions of only 37 countries.  
One can wonder what explains why the negotiators of the Kyoto Protocol decided that 
the Kyoto Protocol was a tolerable consensus. The answer to this question is not within the 
scope of this study; however, of relevance to this matter is a discussion of institutional 
attributes that may have contributed to the lack of ambition. When the Kyoto Protocol was 
negotiated, it was believed that the development of the regime would follow the pattern of the 
ozone regime. The Montreal Protocol has evolved on a near annual basis. If the first version 
of the Montreal Protocol were the version in existence today - it would not have been scored 
highly effective. Flexibility was built into the Montreal Protocol, allowing it to adapt to new 
knowledge, make change or add amendments over time (Barrett, 2003) partially due to a built 
in flexibility mechanism in Article 6. The Kyoto Protocol has always been viewed as a first-
step; negotiators believed that they could adapt the Protocol later, the way the Montreal 
Protocol had been able to (Young, 2010). However, partially due to regime design 
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differences, the climate regime does not have the capacity to make adjustments the way the 
ozone regime has been able to.  
While these design attributes are of relevance in this discussion, there are 
determinedly exogenous factors that are not addressed in the scope of this study that 
contribute to the variance between the regimes on this point. Both regimes began with 
discussions about the problem solving of the respective issues in the mid to late 1980s. The 
ozone regime’s Vienna Convention was adopted in 1985. The UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change was adopted in 1992. From this point on, it is clear that the climate regime 
has faced significant stagnation in comparison to the ozone regime. The Montreal Protocol 
entered into force four years after the adoption of the Vienna Convention. The Kyoto Protocol 
entered into force thirteen years after the UNFCCC was adopted. Thus, it is obvious that even 
if the Kyoto Protocol did allow for more flexibility, the regime faces additional obstacles in 
comparison to the Montreal Protocol.  
There are several other institutional attributes where the regimes also differ. One is on 
the matter of funding. Although the two most recent meetings of the climate regime, the 
COP15 and 16 have shown progress on this matter, until this point, the Kyoto Protocol and 
the UNFCCC do not have a funding mechanism that is as effective as the ozone regime’s 
Multilateral Fund (Young, 2010, p. 96). This affects other aspects of the regime, such as 
technology transfer and developing country participation, which are limited by lacking 
funding for these activities. Both regimes faced similar barriers when it comes to technology 
transfer, but the Montreal Protocol has been more effective at addressing them (Andersen et 
al., 2007). Where the climate regime lacks in a funding mechanism (to date), the presence of 
the flexibility mechanisms in the climate regime are not present in the ozone regime. These 
mechanisms do not contribute to a higher score of effectiveness for the regime.  Overall, it 
would seem that while the climate regime attempted to use the ozone regime as a model, the 
progress of the regime has been slow in comparison, despite innovative measures such as the 
flexibility mechanisms. This leads one to question whether the ozone regime was the best 
model for solving the problem of climate change, an idea also shared by Barrett (2003) and 
Young (2010).  
4.3.2.    Comparing Effectiveness in Terms of Outcome  
When comparing the two regimes on the indicator of outcome effectiveness by a standard of 
goal attainment the regimes do not differ as drastically as they do along the other parameters 
of effectiveness. As should be expected given the review of output effectiveness for the 
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climate regime, the Kyoto Protocol’s lack of ambition increases the chances of countries party 
to Annex B being able to achieve the goals set. Given the terms set by the Kyoto Protocol, the 
climate change regime will be meeting its goals. Similarly, the ozone regime has also met its 
goals set by the Montreal Protocol. The comparison along this indicator is meaningful as an 
attest to the compliance trends of both Protocols. However, as is discussed in the climate 
effectiveness section, this result can only be interpreted in light of the output effectiveness 
score as well.  
A caveat to the use of this indicator for both regimes is that neither regime has begun 
regulation of emissions by developing countries (the Montreal Protocol first phase-outs for 
developing countries started in 2010, thus this study is not able to evaluate yet whether those 
goals have been met). Thus, as global emissions are currently not accounted for in either 
regime, this indicator’s measurement on an aggregate level is somewhat irrelevant. In 
addition, trends of increasing emissions of CFC substitutes and from banks foreshadow that 
ODS emissions have not been fully eliminated and will need to be carefully watched in the 
future. As this study is concerned with aggregate emissions, using the emissions behavior of 
only the developed countries is a limited perspective of effectiveness for both regimes. This is 
particularly the case for the climate regime, for which it is obvious that although the goal has 
been achieved, global progress has not been substantial.  
4.3.3.    Comparing Effectiveness in Terms of Impact 
The regimes vary in impact effectiveness as assessed by the collective optimum ideal 
of environmental quality as defined by scientific advice. Atmospheric concentration is the 
common metric operationalization chosen for the impact indicator. This indicator shows that 
the ozone regime has improved environmental quality, while the climate regime has not had 
an impact. The use of atmospheric concentrations also provides an alternate19 measurement of 
emissions behavior than the goal attainment standard utilized in this study. In either usage of 
this data, the two regime scores differ greatly – the ozone regime being highly effective, and 
the climate regime measuring at a low level of effectiveness.  
An alternate measurement of regime impact effectiveness was assessed by examining 
observations of change in the environment. For the ozone regime, this presents a picture that 
is less effective than using concentrations, because ozone is not increasing. For the climate 
                                                
19 Measuring behavioral change is not the standard way of measuring outcome because concentrations do not 
distinguish between countries and may include GHG or ODS from natural origins, not only anthropogenic (or 
those under the jurisdiction of the regime).   
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regime, the effectiveness classification is the same: observations of climate change and 
temperature have increased regardless of the regime’s presence.  
Both ODS and GHG have long lifetimes, thus concentrations and the subsequent 
changes in the environment are the result of several decades of emissions. This reflects the 
overall uncertainty of both the ozone depletion and climate change problem. Scientists, while 
increasing their understanding of earth science on a nearly daily basis, are still uncertain about 
the time frames for either problem. Thus, using estimations for replenishment of ozone, 
temperature increase, and atmospheric concentrations may be measurements that provide 
incomplete estimates on the impacts the respective problems. This questions the use of impact 
as an indicator of regime effect. While the indicator may not reflect regime consequences, it 
frames the importance of maintaining scientific goals in the regime that reflect the 
environmental impact solution to the problem. Despite its weaknesses, environmental impact 
remains the most ideal evidence of solving the problem, thus it is relevant in this analysis 
particularly as the study has focused on utilizing the collective optimum standard. 
4.3.4.    Areas of Synergy: Comparison Conclusion 
The current comparative analysis has reviewed how the levels of effectiveness of the 
ozone and climate compare with one another. These comparisons are classificatory, but 
highlight areas of variance that serve as the platform for explanatory questions as well as 
highlighting points of interaction. As Gehring and Oberthür (2004) discuss, the concept of 
interaction is intended to refer to a causal relationship. In this thesis the concept is used in a 
descriptive manner. Interaction is relevant in a comparison between the climate regime and 
ozone regime because it draws on several aspects of the comparative analysis.  
  There are scientific similarities between the issues of ozone depletion and 
anthropogenic climate change. The biological feedback effects exist in several directions, as 
both positive and negative feedback, and on each of the indicators. In regards to impact, 
increased UV radiation from ozone depletion harms plants and marine species like 
phytoplankton, in turn reducing their ability to sequester carbon dioxide, thereby enhancing 
anthropogenic climate change (Oberthür, 2001). Likewise, increased temperatures in the 
atmosphere may adversely affect ozone replenishment and enhance ozone depletion, as 
evidenced by the holes in the Arctic and Antarctic ozone layer, which are dependent on 
climate trends in the region. In addition to these effects, ozone depletion substances are also 
greenhouse gases, adding complexity to the regulation of those gases that exist as both. 
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In regards to the output indicator, the policies of the regimes can influence one 
another. Neither regime refers to the other in their textual objectives of the regime. The Kyoto 
Protocol refers to gases that are not regulated by the Montreal Protocol; connections are 
mostly in basket of gases/chemicals regulated. For example, regulating HCFCs through the 
Montreal Protocol mitigates climate change. However, the Montreal Protocol can also have a 
negative effect on climate: increased emissions in HFCs could offset 30 percent of overall 
radiative forcing avoided under the Montreal Protocol by 2010 (WMO, 2010, p. 35). 
Likewise, as HFC is a gas listed in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol, regulation of HFC is of 
consequence for ozone depletion, as this may make it more difficult to utilize as a substitute 
for CFCs/HCFCs. The ozone secretariat is well aware of these interconnections, and the 2010 
Assessment was based on researching how ozone and climate interact. These output 
considerations stimulate changes in emission behavior or outcome in multidirectional ways. 
To conclude, it is clear that while each regime has an individual score for regime 
effectiveness that has been compared to the other, the overlapping points highlight that the 
many areas of synergy between the regimes are anything but straightforward. The potential 
use of these insights in future research will be discussed, along with the recapitulations of the 
thesis, in the following concluding chapter.  
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5.    Conclusion  
 
In this final chapter I first summarize the research question and objective, the analytical 
framework underpinning the study, and the main findings of the thesis. Second, I will review 
areas for further study and prospects for political engineering in the field of international 
environmental regimes. Finally, in culmination of the thesis, concluding remarks on 
effectiveness of the ozone and climate regime are presented.  
5.1.    Summary and Main Findings 
The research objective of this study was to classify regime effectiveness in the 
international ozone depletion regime and the international climate change regime through a 
transparent analytical framework allowing for a robust and nuanced assignment of regime 
effectiveness. The research questions were explicit: How effective are the international ozone 
depletion and climate change regimes and how do these levels of effectiveness compare to 
one another? In answering this question, the analysis sought to also consider: how do 
classifications differ depending on the operationalization of effectiveness?  
In order to answer these questions, the study began with a presentation of the 
theoretical framework grounding the study of international environmental regimes in chapter 
two. Four debates were introduced: i) the definition of the concept of international regimes; ii) 
the explanation of the formation and change of international regimes; iii) the definition and 
operationalization of the concept of regime effectiveness; and iv) the explanation for 
explaining variation in international environmental regimes. Of these debates, the third one 
firmly grounds the study at hand.  
Theoretical choices made throughout this study have influenced the results and 
findings. Of particular importance here are the choices regarding indicators of effectiveness: 
output, outcome, and impact. These three indicators were chosen based on previous studies 
and theory grounded in political science. The second critical decision was taken when 
designing the standards by which each indicator would be evaluated against. The choices to 
use conceptual standards based on the collective optimal solution and goal attainment have 
shaped what level of effectiveness is assigned. These operationalizations of effectiveness and 
the standards by which effectiveness level is determined provided the analytical framework 
for the data analysis.  
After presenting the theoretical underpinnings and analytical framework in chapter 
two, chapter three presented the two cases in terms of the empirical findings. This chapter 
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objectively mapped the data necessary for analysis in preparation for the classificatory 
assessment of regime effectiveness and the comparison between the two regimes.  
In chapter four, the analytical framework was applied to the empirical data provided in 
chapter three. The ozone and climate regimes were assigned a level of effectiveness in a low, 
medium, or high scale along the parameters of output, outcome, and impact effectiveness. The 
decision for scoring each indicator was made through assessment against standards based on 
the collective optimum and goal attainment. After having completed an evaluation of regime 
effectiveness for each regime, the two cases were compared along each indicator. There are 
three main findings of this study which will be briefly summarized: i) level of effectiveness 
for the ozone regime; ii) level of effectiveness of the climate regime; and iii) the comparison 
between the two.  
The study confirmed that the international ozone depletion regime is a highly effective 
regime. When measuring the indicators of output and outcome the regime was assessed at 
high-effectiveness. The regime has not been as effective when measured on the impact 
indicator, likely due to the time-lag issue. However, these results and the associated 
discussion warn against dismissing the ozone depletion problem as being completely and 
optimally solved.  
The evaluation of the international climate change regime has confirmed that the 
regime can be treated with some amount of skepticism based off of its low level of 
effectiveness on all three indicators used in this study. On the output indicator there are some 
areas of optimism, but lacking ambition and country participation overshadow the ability of 
the mechanisms to work to their potential. On the outcome indicator, the goals of the Kyoto 
Protocol are likely going to be attained, however, overall behavioral trends are not headed in 
the direction of effectiveness, or even stabilization as called for by the UNFCCC. Therefore, 
although this indicator includes a “high” score on one measurement, the overall result is low-
effectiveness. Finally, the impact indicator presented an image of low-effectiveness as both 
sub-indicators show declines in environmental quality. This indicator questions the relevance 
of the climate regime’s effect entirely.  
In conclusion, the study completed a comparison of the two regimes. While they 
differed greatly in their level of effectiveness on the output and impact indicator, they were 
similar on the outcome indicator, which was explained by the poor ‘goal’ used in the standard 
for the climate regime. While their differences are large, there are also similarities. This is 
because the climate regime was modeled on the ozone regime development, thus many 
institutional attributes are similar, in addition to the global nature of the problems. Other 
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similarities discovered in comparing the two regimes were presented in the end within the 
concept of interaction. In the final section, these areas of interaction, particularly along the 
impact and output indicators, were presented as a final comparison between the regimes.  
The study provided a multiple-measurement assessment of regime effectiveness for 
the ozone and climate regimes. In doing this, the results are robust and show that depending 
the type of indicator and standard utilized to measure the regime, the score of effectiveness 
can vary. The relevance of this for policy-making is high in an area where, particularly for 
climate change, international cooperation can be casually dismissed as ineffective. This 
multiple measurement of effectiveness provides a holistic interpretation of regime 
effectiveness, and even in the case of the ozone regime, sheds light on the importance of 
maintaining goals that adequately reflect the most ambitious solution to the problem. 
 
5.2.    Prospects for Political Engineering in the Global Arena 
and Further Study  
This study on the effectiveness of international environmental regimes contributes to 
policymaking by providing nuanced set of regime effectiveness scores based on a multiple-
measurement analytical framework. In this section I will first provide some suggestions for 
how the results of this can be relevant for political engineering and policymaking. Second, 
some ideas for future research are proposed.  
This thesis provides several areas where the regimes could focus energy in order to 
improve aspects for increasing effectiveness. The future ozone regime should prepare for 
enhanced matters of interaction with both climate change and the climate regime, as well as 
for potential changes in aggregate emissions trends and compliance as Article 5 countries 
emerge from the grace period. The matter of HFCs being an ODS substitute and significant 
GHG must be addressed by the Montreal Protocol. In addition, should accelerations of 
timetables occur, emphasis could be on enhancing targets for Article 5 countries. Finally, the 
methyl bromide “critical use exemptions” should be reviewed again, with the aim of a 
complete phase-out.  
 The climate change regime has yet to maintain the stability seen in the ozone regime. 
There are many steps that need to be taken, particularly in looking towards the post-2012 
period. The regime is currently negotiating a revised financial mechanism as well as several 
other mechanisms that will likely benefit the future regime Progress on the financial 
mechanism will help facilitate technology transfer and alleviate concerns of non-Annex I 
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countries. . One particular point that arose from the comparative analysis is the lack of 
flexibility in making amendments to the Protocol. This could be addressed in the next 
commitment period. In addition to increasing the ambition and specificity of targets, legally 
binding targets should be extended to as many countries as possible – including those 
currently differentiated – in order to accommodate a larger share of emissions. The ozone 
regime, at the very least, provides an example of providing extensions for developing 
countries while still accounting for them within the legal framework. 
The natural progression of this study would be to use it for exploring potential causal 
mechanisms of regime consequences. Further ideas for future study are now presented, with 
emphasis on changes that could be made to the methodology employed in this study.  One 
future area of research for the international climate change and ozone depletion regimes will 
likely be in the areas in which they interact. This also applies for evaluating regime 
effectiveness. For example, had I assessed impact and outcome effectiveness for the ozone 
regime by a standard of decreases in GHG (not ODS), the Montreal Protocol would be more 
effective at decreasing GHG emissions than the Kyoto Protocol to date. The Montreal 
Protocol is estimated to have contributed to GHG mitigation efforts to an extent that is six 
times greater than the reduction target of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
(The Montreal Protocol having decreased 10-12 GtCO2-eq by 2010) (WMO, 2010, p. 35). 
Thus, in the future, an assessment of the climate and ozone regime effectiveness could include 
an assessment of not only how the regime solves the problem that inspired its own formation, 
but could also include assessments of the regime’s effect on the other regime. This is already 
been taken into consideration for the ozone regime’s effect on climate change, as evidenced 
by the Ozone Trends Panel focus on climate change in the 2010 Scientific Assessment.  
In addition, future studies using a similar design could change the level of analysis. 
This study was designed to evaluate effectiveness from the international level of analysis, in 
order to assess how effective the regimes were on a global scale. However, the study could 
have also been completed at the national level of analysis. For example, recent research has 
found that aggregate climate change mitigation policy is increasing, but on local and national 
scales (Dimitrov, 2010). Using a standard focused on national or sub-national policy 
developments would provide an alternate version of effectiveness in the climate regime. 
Within the international goal of 5 percent reduction of Annex I emissions by 1990, the 
Protocol assumes these goals will be met through national mitigation systems and targets, thus 
national legislation is conducive for a study on the national level of analysis.  
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5.3.    Concluding Remarks  
“In an interconnected and constrained world, in which we have a symbiotic relationship with the planet, 
environmental sustainability is a precondition for poverty eradication, economic development, and social 
justice.”  
     (3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global Sustainability, 2011)  
 
This thesis began from the perspective of globalization. Throughout the study the 
globalization thread has continued to frame the research. As the above quote describes, our 
globalized planet must tackle environmental problems requiring collective action in the 
context of the simultaneous challenges faced by the human population. This thesis focuses on 
a form of governing the global commons in order to serve this challenge. The relevance of 
this field of study will only continue to grow as the world continues to both be interconnected 
and constrained. The two regimes studied struggle to meet the challenges posed by 
globalization, both of the past and the imminent future. Economic growth and associated 
projections of greenhouse gasses and ozone depleting substances emissions from developing 
countries, combined with the extent to which developed countries carry the burden of past 
emissions has been, and will remain, the focal point of future regime decisions. 
Governing the atmospheric global commons in the context of ozone depletion and 
climate change is referred to as the biggest challenge of humankind. The study at hand has 
provided an evaluation of how well we are meeting these challenges thus far through 
international cooperation. The results provide both reasons for optimism and pessimism 
depending on the interpretation and the analytical perspective chosen. One thing is certain: 
although there is room for improvement, there is no time for despair.   
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Annexes  
 
Annex I: Controls for Chemicals under the Montreal Protocol20 
Chemicals  Developed Countries  
Phase out Schedule 
Developing Countries  
Phase out Schedule  
Chlorofourocarbons (CFCs)  Phase out by 1996  Phase out by 2010 
Halons  Phase out by 1994  Phase out by 2010 
Carbon tetrachloride  Phase out by 1996  Phase out by 2010 
Methyl chloroform  Phase out by 1996  Freeze by 2003 at average 1998‐2000 levels, 
reduce by 30 percent by 2005 and by 70 
percent by 2010, and phase out by 2015  
Hydrobromoflurocarbons (HBFCs)  Phase out by 1996  Phase out by 1996 
 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) 
Reduce by 35% by 2004 
75% by 2010 
90% 2015 
Phase out 2020 with 0.5% 
servicing from 2020‐30 
Freeze by 2013 at 2009‐10 levels,  
10% by 2015 
35% 2020 
67.5% 2025 
Phase out by 2030, 2.5 servicing 2030‐40 
Methyl bromide (CH3Br)  Phase out by 2005  Freeze by 2002 at average 1995‐1998 levels, 
reduce by 20% by 2005, phase out by 2015  
Bromochloromethane (BCM)  Phase out by 2002  Phase out by 2002 
 
 
Annex II: Chronology of Major Events and Recent Developments of the International Climate 
Change Regime 
Year   Organization/Meeting and associated development  
1972  UN Conference on Human Development – Stockholm, Sweden  
1979   World Climate Conference: development of the World Climate Program (WCP) 
1985  WCP, WMO, UNEP, International Council of Scientific Unions  ‐ Villach, Austria: 
declared global warming a possibility  
1986   The Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gasses (AGGG) established under the WMO, 
UNEP, ICSU 
1988  Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: policy recommendation for a 20% 
decline in emissions from 1988 levels by 2005 
1988  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change established  
1990   IPCC ‐ First Assessment Report  
1990   Discussions for a convention began  
1991  Within structure of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) negotiations 
for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) began under the 
United Nations General Assembly 
1992   United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) Earth 
Summit, Rio de Janeiro: UNFCCC adopted and opened for signatures  
                                                
20 Data accessible from the Scientific Assessment Report 2010 (WMO 2010) 
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1994  The UNFCCC enters into force after receiving 50 ratifications.  
1993  US President Bill Clinton enters into office and the US was able to reverse the George 
H. W. Bush policy in opposition to negotiations, progressing international ability to 
discuss the matter of protocol further. 
1995   First Conference of the Parties (COP1) to the UNFCCC 
1996   
1997  COP3 – The Kyoto Protocol negotiated (see table in text for details) 
1998  COP4 – Buenos Aires, plan and 2 year deadline for when Kyoto would enter into force 
2001  COP7 – Morocco. After negotiations on mechanisms dominating, KP 
operationalization finally agreed upon.  
2004  Russia ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, officially accounting for the necessary 55% of 
emissions 
2005  February 16: Kyoto Protocol enters into force of its first commitment period, 2008‐
2012 
2005   COP11, CMP1: Montreal. Sights set for COP13 where a plan would be developed for 
post 2012  
2007  COP13: Bali Action Plan negotiated, laying a plan for preparing for COP15/CMP5  
2008  COP14: Poznan. Lack of progress on Bali Action Plan  
2009  COP15/CMP5: Copenhagen Accord, non‐adopted non‐legally binding political 
agreement. Failure to negotiate post‐2012 framework. 
2010  COP16: Cancun Agreements ‐ set goals and pathway for COP17 and hopeful post‐
2012 framework  
 
 
Annex III: Highlights of Climate Change Observations from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report  
 
Highlights of Climate Change Observations from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007)    
 
From 1900 to 2005, long term trends of increased precipitation have been observed in eastern parts of North 
and South America, northern Europe, and central Europe, whereas precipitation declined in the Sahel, the 
Mediterranean, southern Africa, and parts of southern Asia. In addition, it is very likely that cold days, cold 
nights, and frosts have become less frequent, while hot days and hot nights have become more common since 
1970 (Trenberth et al., 2007).  
 
Tropical cyclone activity in the North Atlantic has increased since 1970 (IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2007b)  
 
The IPCC has documented not only evidence of the drivers of climate change (i.e. atmospheric concentrations 
and temperature change) but also changes on earth that are the result of climate change, but only a few will 
be highlighted here. There is, for example, “high confidence” of a trend of earlier greening of vegetation in 
the spring linked to longer thermal growing seasons (WGII 1.3, 8.2, 14.2). Terrestrial biological systems are 
experiences changes such as in bird migration, egg‐laying, and upward shifts in plant and animal species. 
There is high confidence that changes in marine and freshwater biological systems, such as shifts in algal, 
plankton, and fish abundance in high latitude and high‐altitude lakes, range changes and earlier fish 
migrations in rivers, are associated with rising water temperatures, change in ice cover, salinity, oxygen levels, 
and circulation (IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007c) 
 
Changes in managed and human systems, with medium confidence as a result of climate change have been 
observed. These changes are in agricultural and forestry management at Northern Hemisphere higher 
latitudes, human health (infectious disease vectors, or earlier onset of allergenic pollen), and human activities 
in the Arctic, such as hunting in tundra areas, and recreational activities on snow (IPCC, 2007c).  
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